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Page 1Introduction
1  INTRODUCTION
Previous studies by CAENZ have clearly
enunciated the opportunities for Distributed
Generation (DG) in New Zealand [12]. The
technology has emerged both as a potentially
attractive means of providing new electricity
generation and as an alternative to expanding
the capacity (and/or enhancing security) of
established transmission and distribution
networks.
The attractiveness of DG has risen because of
the ongoing improvement in the enabling
technologies, the changing structure of the
electricity industry, and government encourage-
ment of renewable energy and “community”
energy solutions.
At the same time, continued conventional
development of large scale core grid connected
generation with its associated transmission
reinforcement is becoming more challenging
from the perspective of finding suitable routes,
consenting of large-scale installations, and
achieving optimal investment patterns. It is
also becoming increasingly accepted that the
creation of an economically efficient and
sustainable development path for electricity
supply will require modernisation of the total
system with solutions that will have a signifi-
cant component of DG.
A further factor that has acted to enhance the
uptake of DG is that failure at a national level
to ensure the necessary investments to support
the current centralised delivery model. This has
lead to incremental investments in new
generation capacity, reduced reserves margins
and increasing pressure on the electricity
network reliability and adequacy. Within this
environment DG solutions offer shorter con-
struction lead times, easier access to re-
sources, reduced financial risk and hence
improved investor appetite and willingness to
invest.
Transition from a system that is currently
dependent on centralised generation, and its
customised supporting transmission grid to
deliver system level performance requirements,
to one that has devolved some of that function
to distributed generation, is a large hurdle to
overcome. Sufficient DG investment is required
before it can collectively assume some of
functions, such as security, from the larger
generation facilities. Thus, while in some
respects complimentary, DG can be seen as a
competitor to centralised generation and
transmission. Broadening the investment
opportunity to other sectors of the industry is
being matched by more DG being installed.
Undoubtedly from an economic perspective the
use of DG prime facia has definite attractions.
However barriers do exist. The business
environment for the uptake of DG is strongly
influenced at present by the uncertainty around
the market frameworks in New Zealand.
Complexity, technical requirements, levels of
service, retail and connection contracts all
contribute to investor perception of risk.
An issue has been the apparent inconsistencies
between network companies in their treatment
of DG investment and the value ascribed to the
DG asset in terms of network security and
reliability. There are also disparities in the ways
in which transmission charges are passed
through to end customers through the network
operators by way of the retailer’s retail tariffs.
From a national perspective it is essential that
network companies have a good knowledge
and understanding of the motivations that
attract DG investment. DG solutions can
overcome traditional transmission and distribu-
tion lines problems especially where demand
diversity and peak load profiles are a signifi-
cant management issues. However, it cannot be
assumed that every distribution network faces
these problems. Through historical investment
decisions, demographic changes, economic
growth (or decline) and a range of other
compounding issues individual network
companies will have different motivations and
drivers in respect of their total asset manage-
ment strategies.
It is these strategies that ultimately determine
how network owners will respond to the
challenges of DG integration within their
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network business. Understanding these factors
is critical to the successful uptake of DG. For
these reasons CAENZ has sought in this study
to examine the commercial uptake of DG within
the current regulated environment and estab-
lish some of the factors that lead to successful
DG investment.
The study itself looks at a number of case
studies and addresses the features of the
different DG alternatives and how these
integrate within existing networks. By offering
a common framework for addressing the
technical and commercial issues around
increased DG penetration it is hoped that a
more strategic and integrated approach to
developing local DG opportunities will ensue.
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2  SCOPE OF THE CURRENT STUDY
In this study CAENZ has adopted a framework
approach to facilitate its assessment of the
network and system benefits of DG uptake.
This is intended to deliver a more strategic and
integrated approach to assessing energy
investments in developing local DG applica-
tions.
The project, thus, examined a number of
selected network opportunities from the
perspective of the DG project sponsor and
through discussion with the incumbent network
operator assessed the perceived network
benefits and potential for further deployment
of other opportunities within the selected
network area.
A generic framework for characterising the
different factors and their application at the
distribution level was established as set out
below:
Commercial Characteristics
• Investment Criteria (DCF, Hurdle Rate, Time
Frame)
• Lines Companies business model
• DG Investor objectives
• Market Issues
Applications
• Intermittent
• Cogeneration
• Standby
System Performance
• Transmission and Distribution
• Diversity
• Adequacy and Security
Regional Development
• Local authority and consumer priorities
• Network Issues
• Access and consenting
Regulatory Environment
• Government policy and support schemes
• Regulation of Lines Companies
• DG Regulations
Operating Experience
• Pricing
• Network benefits
It was not possible to apply all these criteria to
each of the cases studies, however, in general
sufficient information was able to be gathered
to allow the appraisal of the different ap-
proaches used to overcome the technical
challenges as well as the various connection
and commercial issues likely to affect economic
performance. In addition the effectiveness of
current policy instruments to facilitate DG
uptake have been examined and comparisons
made with the realities encountered by the
generator owner.
The analysis undertaken involved a staged
process and considered up to three sites in
each network studied to avoid stretching
limited resources. To this end for each network
company involved, consultation was required
within the network company, associated energy
generators and the commercial and industrial
users.
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3 DG CHARACTERISTICS & SYSTEM
PERFORMANCE
A definition of DG
The Electricity Governance (Connection of
Distributed Generation) Regulations 2007 [3]
define distributed generation as equipment
used or proposed to be used for generating
electricity that is:
• connected or proposed to be connected to
a distribution network, or to a consumer
installation that is connected to a distribu-
tion network; and
• is capable of injecting electricity into that
distribution network.
In this study we adhere to this definition,
including cogeneration equipment (even if not
actually injecting energy into the network, but
capable of ) and the use of backup-generators
for peak lopping (including generation not
synchronised and connected to the system).
Distributed generation can transverse a range
of applications: from smaller scale power
stations (including wind, landfill gas, biomass
and small hydro), cogeneration or combined
heat and power plants, small stand-alone
diesel generators and domestic or small
commercial photovoltaic solar generation.
The study assumes three Modes of DG Opera-
tion:
• Mode 1 is the standby generator designed
for security of supply (eg for computer
installations or hotels) or for peak lopping,
which may operate less than 100 hours per
year. Firming generation may operate for
500 hours per year. In standby DG we
include both generators that are synchro-
nized with the grid as well as those which
are not but once the load is temporarily
disconnected from the network they start
up.
• Mode 2 is that which is dependent on an
intermittent or inexact fuel supply (eg run
of river or limited storage hydro,
photovoltaics with limited battery storage
or wind generators), this is semi base load,
in that it runs as much as it’s fuel supply
allows. This generation may also be
operated to optimise against other genera-
tion and/or locational/timing effects on
pricing e.g. running a hydro scheme with
storage for 4 hours/day at peak times when
spot price is highest. Use of gas (for say
firming wind generation) may be viable
only during the 8 hour daytime base load
period.
• Mode 3 is base load generation which to
be economic is usually of the CHP variety
(eg Industrial co-generation or a domestic
Stirling engine arrangement) or runs on a
supply of free fuel, such as methane
extracted from a landfill site or sewerage
pipes or coal seams. This generation may
still not be run during off-peak periods if
pricing conditions are below its economic
threshold.
We also assume four distinct DG Size Bands,
with each having its particular barriers and
issues. The 2007 Regulations distinguish two
DG size bands (10kW and below, and above
10kW). The second band encompasses the
bands 2 to 4 below, but with different
timeframes for consideration and prescribed
fees.
• Band 1 is below 10kW which is typical for
households and includes PV’s, small engine
gen-sets, micro CHP and small wind mill
battery chargers or pumps. Usually these
systems use an inverter to interconnect.
• Band 2 is between 10kW and 1 MW.  This
includes commercial standby generation
usually diesel or gas engines or small gas
turbines as well as some mini-hydro
schemes.
• Band 3 is 1 to 5MW which is where line
companies might invest, or have an interest
in generation. Diesels, mobile gas turbines,
and small hydro are likely contenders here.
Waste methane fuelled gas engines used at
landfills or sewerage works are also
typically in this range.
• Band 4 is 5MW or above, which typically
covers line investment in new renewables
(wind or geothermal or hydro) plus indus-
trial cogeneration. Lines companies
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currently are required under the Electricity
Industry Reform Act 1998 [4] to have a
separate company to undertake investment
above 5MW it total. (Under current legisla-
tion lines companies can only sell the
output of generation plant – exemptions
are listed in Section 5(2) of the Act.)
Potential Impacts of DG on
Networks
There is a significant literature on the likely
impacts from the operation of a distribution
system with a large amount of distributed
generation1. Typically these can be described
as:
• Voltage profiles change along the network,
depending on the power produced and the
consumption levels, leading to a behaviour
different from the typical one
• Voltage transients will appear as a result of
connection and disconnecting of generators
or even as a result of their operation
• Short-circuit levels increase
• Losses change as a function of the produc-
tion and load levels
• Congestion in system branches is a
function of the production and load levels
• Power quality and reliability may be
affected
• Utility protection needs to be coordinated
with the schemes installed on the genera-
tor’s side.
DG spans a wide range of technologies, sizes
and fuels. The potential impacts on the
network can thus vary accordingly and because
of the complexity of the factors involved it is
difficult to generalise as to these effects.
Resolving these issues typically resides with
the network company or system operator. In
this report, therefore, it is not intended to
cover these issues in detail, but there are a
number of important factors that characterise
system operation that are generally not well
understood by people from outside the
industry who may be contemplating DG
investments.
The following commentary sets out in a general
sense the range of issues that might arise with
increasing DG uptake. These issues are well
understood by the industry and standard
solutions are available.
Configuration of the Network
Traditionally distribution networks have
consisted entirely of passive elements arranged
in a tapered radial configuration. Electricity is
injected into a network at one point only (the
GXP) and the network is generally designed on
the basis that power will flow in one direction
only, away from the GXP and towards the load.
The magnitude of power flow in any part of the
network is determined almost entirely by the
nature of the connected load. The required
capacity of any element in the network is
determined by the maximum connected load,
after making appropriate allowances for
additional capacity in order to provide the
required level of reliability under contingency
operating conditions. If the distributed genera-
tor absorbs rather than exports reactive energy,
the network may also need to supply reactive
power.
In a network containing DG, there will be
multiple points of injection. Further, at any
time, the power injected into the network at
any particular injection point is unpredictable
since DG is not subject to centralised dispatch.
Indeed, the power injection will increasingly be
determined by the availability of the primary
energy source, which in many instances are
from uncontrolled renewable energy sources
such as wind speed, water flow or sunlight, or
from fluctuating industrial production.
Some DG can be dispatched be the distribution
network operator or operated to an agreed set
of criteria.  Such generation may be being
applied to management of transmission cost
for example. DG has many more potential
applications (and revenue streams) than just
1 Technical issues are those that relate to the physical
connection of the generation plant and resulting effect it
has of the distribution network. Issues include network
congestion, voltage support, protection control and fault
levels, capacity constraints, noise, harmonics and power
quality, operational safety and control, access for
metering and network stability. Many of the connection
issues must be analysed through system studies and
modelling. This process requires time and specialist skills.
Each proposed generation connection has individual
characteristics and each must be treated individually.
Submissions on the draft regulations indicate the
distribution companies are unhappy with treating all
connections in a ‘one size fits all’ way with regard to
application approval times.
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the production of energy. It will be applied to
the highest value combination of uses.
This means that power flow can be bi-direc-
tional and the direction of power flow may vary
at any point in time. For this to be controlled
or predicted requires a mix of generation types
and modes in diverse locations plus more
developed measurement and control capability.
This in turn means that the traditional tapered
radial configuration may no longer be appropri-
ate. Networks that are more heavily intercon-
nected or meshed are likely to be more DG
capable.
Network Operation and Safety
A regulatory requirement of electricity network
operation is the need to ensure the safety of
both the field staff that work on the network
and also of members of the public.
Operation of a traditional distribution network
is more straight forward when a network has
only one point of injection. When a part of the
network is disconnected, all downstream
components of the network will be de-ener-
gised. Where backup circuits are available to
restore supply downstream of a disconnected
or isolated part of a network, the associated
connection points are limited in number and
under the control of the network owner. The
safe operation of a distribution network
becomes more complex where there are
multiple points of injection. Where infeeds from
DG or backup circuits are possible from both
ends of, and possibly within, a de-energised
section of a network, the possibility of inad-
vertent re-energisation increases.
One complexity DG adds is the possibility of
synchronisation with the grid being lost.
Generation will trip ‘off line’ if a mismatch
between generation capacity and load occurs.
Generators cannot connect back onto the
network automatically i.e. the process is
controlled by the system operator. Essentially,
the distribution network behaves and is
operated in a similar fashion to the transmis-
sion grid. The current safety operating rules
have been developed for all parts of the NZ
system. DG presents no new operating or
safety issues that aren’t already being ad-
equately managed.
Protection
With the addition of generation embedded
within the network, the distribution system can
experience new operating conditions and the
network design, and particularly the protection
design, may need to be modified to accommo-
date this. Possible scenarios that can arise
include:
• an 11 kV distribution network is normally
connected to earth through the supply
transformer at the zone substation. If a
generator connected at 400 V is allowed to
backfeed into an 11 kV network that is not
connected to the supply transformer, there
could be no earth connection on the 11 kV
system, creating an unsafe operating
condition; and
• if a connection between a distributed
generator and the rest of the electricity
supply network is momentarily lost and
then restored, the mains supply may be out
of synchronisation with the generator when
power is restored.
Metering
The type of metering necessary for embedded
generation will largely be determined by
industry requirements or by the commercial
arrangements between the generator operator,
the electricity purchaser and the network
owner. Interval (time-of-use) metering, which
measures the energy output in half hourly time
intervals is currently necessary if the generator
output is sold through the wholesale market.
Where DG is connected to a network and
electricity is exporetd, the generator must
ensure a seperate record of inflows/outflows of
electricity and metering must comply with the
rules contained in the DG Regulations [3 ].
Regulated terms apply in situations where
distributor/generator have not negoitated a
contract.
The installation of local micro-generation within
a customer’s own premises may create situa-
tions where the customer will at times be
taking electricity off the network and at other
times be feeding surplus electricity into the
network. A standard accumulating three-phase
or single-phase meter will measure net con-
sumption (or generation) in such situations.
However, the use of these meters in such
situations creates commercial problems as the
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retailer is in effect buying electricity at the
retail sale price. Bi-directional meters that
separately measure electricity flow in each
direction to obtain power flows are also
available.
Network Thermal Capacity
When a distributed generator is connected to a
network, the network must have sufficient
thermal capacity to deliver the generated
power to the load. Network capacity is usually
limited by the allowable temperature rise of
the lines, termed “thermal capacity”. This
means that the surrounding network may need
to be upgraded before the generator can be
connected. However, situations can arise where
the connection of a distributed generator can
allow the cost of a network upgrade to be
deferred or even avoided.
Consider a situation where power demand
located some distance from a GXP grows to the
extent that an upgrade of the network deliver-
ing electricity from the GXP is required. The
connection of a distributed generator close to
the load may allow the network upgrade to be
avoided. Further, in such a situation network
losses will be reduced. The above is a simplis-
tic example, limited by the obligation of the
network to be able to meet the power demand
at times when the distributed generator is not
operating. Nevertheless, situations often arise
when the connection of DG can allow network
upgrades to be deferred until upgrade is
economic or avoided.
Where there are a large number of small
distributed generators (of different types and
reliable), the need to upgrade transmission and
distribution networks to supply the total
distribution network load is significantly
reduced by the diversity of generation sources.
Unless the primary fuel source is common and
it fails, the probability of all the distributed
generators not being in operation at the same
time is low and potentially an acceptable risk.
Network Steady State Voltage Changes
DG has a significant inter-relationship with
voltages on a network, and depending on the
network characteristics can incur negative or
positive impacts on the network. Electrical
equipment is designed to operate at a particu-
lar rated voltage, typically 400 volt three phase
or 230 volt single phase. If the network voltage
is too low, the equipment may fail to operate
as designed, while voltage that is too high may
damage the equipment, possibly to the extent
that the equipment becomes dangerous. The
voltage on a distribution network will vary with
load, rising as the load reduces and dropping
as the load increases. It is therefore necessary
to design the network to limit these voltage
excursions. In New Zealand, regulations require
the voltage at the point of entry to a consum-
er’s installation must be within +/- 6% of
nominal, except for momentary variations
under transient conditions.
Whereas in high voltage networks (transmis-
sion lines) the voltage fluctuation is primarily
related to reactive power flows, in low-voltage
distribution networks, the real power flows
(and therefore real power production by DG)
has significant impact on voltage fluctuations.
The fact that network voltages can change
significantly as the real power output of a
distributed generator is altered can be prob-
lematic for a network owner. It means that the
voltage at the generator point of connection
may need to rise to unacceptable levels to
permit the export of the generated power.
This inability to control network voltage
independently of real power flow can signifi-
cantly affect the maximum generation capacity
that can be feasibly connected to an existing
distribution network, even where the relevant
network elements would appear to have the
thermal capacity to export the generated
power. Also variable power output (e.g. by
intermittent renewable generators) can make
voltage control on a line quite difficult, even if
automatic controls exist (e.g. on-load auto-
matic tap changers on distribution transform-
ers).
Generally this is scenario that would only arise
when the generation was significant in scale to
the capacity of the network. For this reason
there is a regulatory connection design
approval process administered by network
companies.
On the other hand, situations often arise where
the connection of a distributed generator will
allow the voltage regulation of a network to be
improved. The connection of a generator to a
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distribution network can thus be beneficial in
situations where the network capacity is
insufficient to maintain voltage at the point of
entry to a consumer’s installation at acceptable
levels. Further, if a synchronous generator has
the capability to regulate the voltage in its
field winding, it can continuously control the
voltage at the point of connection.
Where a reliable solution to a network voltage
issue can be provided by DG network opera-
tors may wish to purchase such services.
Power Quality
Steady state voltage regulation can be signifi-
cantly affected by the real power output of a
generator. It follows that dynamic variation in
real power output can cause dynamic fluctua-
tions in system voltage levels. This can be a
particular problem for the connection of
generators, such as wind turbines, where the
real power output is uncontrolled. Since wind
turbine power is dependent on the wind speed
(theoretically, wind power is proportional to the
wind velocity cubed) at any point in time, the
real power output will be continuously fluctuat-
ing and this could adversely affect system
voltage levels.  Some variations in electricity
production and harmonics by power electronics
can cause voltage flicker due to interaction of
the real power output with the system imped-
ance.
This is more likely where the fault level of the
system is low, i.e. system impedance is high.
Situations can also arise where power quality
problems on a network prior to connection of a
generator can be injurious to the generator
itself. Differing power flows in the three phases
of a three-phase network could cause addi-
tional heating of the generator windings, which
if significant could require the generator to be
derated, thereby reducing the maximum power
output.
Harmonics, or high frequency variations in
system voltage caused by the connection of
non-linear loads to a network, can cause
similar problems. It should be noted, however,
that regulations and electrical codes of practice
exist that require network owners to maintain
the delivery voltage within limits and, with
electricity consumers, to keep the delivery or
injection of harmonic voltages and currents
below prescribed levels. If the power quality on
the external network complies with the
regulations, it should not be a problem for a
well designed embedded generator.
Transient Stability
Transient stability is associated with the ability
of a generator to maintain synchronism with
the main grid, following a network fault or step
load change. The problem becomes more acute
if the network to which a generator is con-
nected is weak, i.e. it has a low fault level. The
addition of a generator to a network could add
to the risk of a loss of energy supply on the
network following a system incident due to the
possibility that the incident may cause the
generator to disconnect from the gird. This
generator disconnection can exacerbate the
original problem and increase the severity of
the incident from which the network must
recover.
Transient stability issues can arise on networks
that appear to have adequate thermal capacity
to accommodate the generated loads. It is
possible to model the stability of a generator
following a system disturbance using dynamic
simulation software and such modelling is
recommended if it is considered that stability
could be a problem.
Generation must integrate technically to the
distribution system it is embedded into and
therefore network owners will have a range of
technical requirements that may create limita-
tions to a DG opportunity.
Fault Levels
Rotating plant, including generators, connected
to an electricity supply network will feed
current into the network under fault conditions.
This current is limited only by the internal
reactance of the machine and the network
within the fault area and can be very large.
Clearly, connecting a distributed generator to a
network will increase the potential fault current
in the surrounding network, possibly to the
extent that it exceeds the fault current rating of
other current carrying equipment, particularly
switchgear and fuses. In such circumstances
this equipment must be replaced with higher
rated plant, or other remedial measures, such
as the connection of fault current limiting
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reactors, put in place.
The engineering is well understood and
standard solutions exist for all the above
issues. The challenge for NZ is that network
operators traditionally do not have any
experience with generation on their networks
and engineering support for investors is limited
particularly in the regions. There is a significant
learning curve cost hurdle for those first off the
block.
Potential Contributions/
Benefits of DG
The value of DG to the network owner is a
balance between the benefits obtained from
the investment and the costs incurred by the
network due to the DG connection [5]. The
benefits of DG in distribution networks include
deferral of investment, improved system
security, improved power quality such as
voltage profiles and customer outages and
reduction in line losses resulting in increased
efficiency of the system [3]. The costs of
connecting DG to the network include in-
creased requirement for protection systems,
reduction in system security and stability,
reduction in power quality and network
redundancy [6]. These benefits are also able to
be realised from the transmission system and
are often of higher value because to distribu-
tion systems ability to aggregate and diversify
the load presented at a GXP.
CAENZ has done significant previous work
quantifying the range of benefits that can
accrue to the network owner under optimal
conditions [7] The following sections summa-
rise some of this analysis.
Transmission
Transmission networks can benefit from
Distributed Generation as it can defer the
requirement for security upgrades. Security
constraints are generally reached before
capacity constraint becomes an issue. Distrib-
uted generation (specifically diesel gensets)
can be applied to cover the security constraint
until upgrade of normal capacity is warranted.
Similarly a security constraint can be covered
until the duration of the constraint justifies
greater expenditure.
The ability to concentrate load and generation,
with a higher quality of diversity, at GXPs
compared to smaller segments of distribution
networks incentivises application of DG to
transmission optimisation in priority to
distribution.
Distribution
Distribution networks face the same security
cost/service issues as transmission networks.
However their loads are smaller, more spread
out, and more likely to be spur connected.
Security provision, via interconnection and
redundancy, consistently to all consumers is
likely to be beyond affordability. Whereas the
upgrade or dual installation of a line or
transformer addresses the security of one asset
at one location, the security provided by a
generator can impact deeper into a network
and, if mobile, can be used at several loca-
tions. Its security provision will also extend up
into the transmission system. In general,
security is most effectively delivered at the
lowest voltage possible [7].
While DG can improve system performance by
being an alternative to line upgrades there are
other potential negative performance effects
such as harmonics, fault levels and voltage
issues. Small scale DG systems often require
the use of inverter technology to connect to
the network. This technology can introduce
harmonics into the system adversely affecting
other customers but technology has developed
to overcome this issue. Fault levels on net-
works may increase due to increases in
numbers and sizes of rotating machines
installed as DG. These machines can increase
the fault level of a network necessitating
improvements to substation switch gear and
fault control equipment.
These upgrades can make the cost of installing
the DG prohibitive just as the added cost of
transmission upgrade may make centralised
generation uneconomic. DG can also create
voltage support issues in a network where
during light load DG may create an over
voltage situation and may contribute to an
under voltage situation if the DG were to trip.
Additional DG may also cause voltage flicker,
an additional issue to be managed by the
distribution company.
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Capacity constraints within a distribution
network tend to be more localized than a
transmission network and the reduced load
diversity often results in a more peaky load
profile. The capital cost of upgrades can greatly
exceed the prospects for revenue growth. This
is a common issue for long lines remote from
sub-transmission support. Constraints may be
related to short seasonal loads such as holiday
loads. Volt drop problems may only be present
for a few hours per day or a few weeks per
year. In these scenarios distributed generation,
along with other solutions such as capacitors,
voltage regulators, etc., can provide temporary
relief until the constraint condition exists for
sufficient duration to justify a permanent line
upgrade [8].
Network capacity constraints can be alleviated
with DG connected close to the major regional
loads. This depends on how the network is
arranged in the major load areas and what
type of fuel is locally available to make the
cost-benefit analysis worthwhile for the DG
investment. For this benefit to accrue, the
network company would have to have some
level of control or influence on generation
despatch during times of capacity constraints.
Adequacy and Security
Security is an issue that affects all levels of the
power system from transmission through to
consumer installations. In general the availabil-
ity of more DG in the region has the potential
to improve security of supply and network
reliability criteria (SAIDI, SAIFI and CAIDI) with
local generation supplying local loads through
shorter and more robust line connections. If
designed appropriately with sufficient genera-
tion control, the improved connections can
provide consumers with shorter outage times.
In certain cases additional line connections will
provide a (n-1) security level where this would
not be available without the DG connections in
the network [8].
Similarly a dedicated DG power supply source
close to matching loads has the potential to
improve availability of supply by not being
exposed to the major network faults and
outages. In some cases it is possible to run the
DG and matching load as an islanded system
for a short time and allow connected consum-
ers to be supplied independent of the major
system outages.
Expenditure on security provisions can be very
difficult to justify because the duration of
contingent events are short and probabilities of
outages very low. The traditional full redun-
dancy approach to providing security at
transmission level tends to be prohibitive for
small loads. Consumers are therefore served
with inconsistent levels of security dependent
on where they are connected to the grid and in
terms of the transmission charges they pay.
In general distributed generation can deliver
greater resolution in the security standards
able to be provided. Security constraints are
generally reached before a capacity constraint
becomes an issue and thus distributed genera-
tion can be applied to cover the security
constraint until upgrade of normal capacity is
warranted. Similarly a security constraint can
be covered until the duration of the constraint
justifies greater expenditure.
Transpower applies much higher security
standards (particularly in the core grid) than
line companies tend to apply/deliver on their
distribution networks. Coordination of these
different standards in light of what is actually
delivered to the consumer may present
opportunity for rationalization and alternatives
such as distributed generation.
Commercial/Contractual Factors
Contractual issues of cover a wide range of
areas from rules and requirements of site
access and inspection to lines and connection
charges and rebates on transmission tariffs. It
is the effect that distributed generation has on
the overall power system and how the mon-
etary flows arising from those effects is
proportioned that is the most contentious
issue when assessing the impact of different
DG technologies. A number of these issues are
outlined below in more detail.
At the transmission level when the capacity of
a Transpower GXP becomes constrained the
cost of upgrading the grid connection assets is
charged to the users of those assets via the
terms and conditions of a Transpower New
Investment Agreement. If the demand pre-
sented to grid can be constrained to within the
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capacity of the GXP then upgrade can be
deferred. Capacity upgrade typically involves a
significant step increase in the capacity and
size or quantity of the assets involved. Load
may be growing in relatively small increments,
which presents issues of capital efficiency
when large investment is required but the
capacity increment can only be utilized over a
long period.
Distributed generation can contribute in several
ways:
• It can improve peak management and
therefore allow load to be managed within
the constraint.
• Capacity can be delivered in increments
that match load growth.
• Capital expenditure can be minimized.
• GXP upgrade can be deferred until there is
a significant gap between supply and
demand such that the utilization of new
assets is sufficient to deliver an adequate
return on investment i.e. generation can be
used as a “stop gap” measure.
At the distribution level capacity constraints
tend to be more localized than a transmission
network and the reduced load diversity often
results in a more peaky load profile. The capital
cost of upgrades can greatly exceed the
prospects for revenue growth. This is a common
issue for long lines remote from sub-transmis-
sion support. Constraints may be related to
short seasonal loads such as holiday loads. Volt
drop problems may only be present for a few
hours per day or a few weeks per year. In these
scenarios distributed generation, along with
other solutions such as capacitors, voltage
regulators, etc., can provide temporary relief
until the constraint condition exists for sufficient
duration to justify a permanent line upgrade.
Generically, however, one could say that when
the DG-installation is based on an intermittent,
renewable source, the benefits to the local
network will generally be very limited, as the
production cannot be relied upon to be
available when needed. The situation changes
with dispersal of DG throughout a network or
feeder due to the complementary energy
production nature of differing DG types and
uses. Collectively the dispersed generators may
be able to provide a more stable generation
profile than by a group of closely located units
or a single unit alone. This allows for a greater
investment deferral benefit in comparison with
non firm generation [14].
Consumer installations also face capacity
related connection charges and pay for
connection asset upgrades on a use basis. For
large consumers, needing a dedicated HV cable
connection for example, upgrade costs can
exceed the cost of a generator and achieving a
capital efficient capacity increment can also be
challenging for companies with short risk
horizons. Adding distributed generation to a
consumer’s installation increases the diversity
of their load and potentially provides more
capability to manage demand.
Connection charges (both fixed cost network
upgrade and ongoing lines charges) can
involve complex monetary flows between the
various parties especially in an industrial/
commercial situation. In the absence of
standardised contract forms, administering,
negotiating and enforcing all payment and
billing schedules is a complex process and
open to dispute.
CAENZ studies [1, 7] have reinforced the
importance of commercial/contractual arrange-
ments in determining final commercial perform-
ance.
DG Investment Criteria
Ultimately, the only real investment criterion for
distributed generation is profit. The form and
size of this profit may be different between
different investors but no investment is likely
to be undertaken if it will lose money in the
long term. There does appear to be some
exceptions to this though where perhaps the
unit is run as a demonstration model in order
to facilitate information exchange or increase
knowledge on the installation and operation of
DG. Mainpower is one such example where
they have a 35 year payback for their PV
project on their office roof.
As noted above, profit may not be realised as
extra monetary income from the generated
electricity but in the form of unrealised
(avoided) costs, where load is now supplied via
the distributed generation at a cheaper price
than previously obtained from the network.
Ways of measuring profit may be through an
Page 13DG Characteristics & System Performance
increase in cash flows or via ‘capturing the
retail margin’, where the retail margin is the
difference in price between power bought from
the retailer and that produced by the DG.
Pricing structures within the industry and
regulatory control still have a major effect on
people’s preparedness to make an investment.
For example, the requirement for network
companies to share transmission savings with
consumers, rather than DG investors, is a dis-
incentive to network company support.
Sizing of DG is related to the economics of the
installation and the intended use. A residential
unit is not likely to be large whereas a co-gen
unit at a large industrial site will be the largest
affordable to give a good investment return.
The economics of the installation largely
govern the size of installation alongside the
application of the generation e.g. is it simply
displacing load off the distribution network or
is it actively operating to inject onto the
distribution network?
The issue of generator siting within the context
of the distribution network is vitally important
and is discussed further in the following
Chapter. DG can be connected at a site where
there are capacity constraints, consequently
reducing those constraints. DG can also be
sited in an unfavourable location resulting in
increased congestion on the distribution
network. These and many other issues includ-
ing voltage control, frequency and synchronisa-
tion have to be worked through when a
distributed generator applies for connection to
the distribution network.
The characteristics of the network determine
the relative weightings needed to be given to
the various cost and benefits arising from a
single installation. This, in turn, is influenced
by the combination of DG technology type, the
technological impacts of the DG investment
and the network structure and load profile. DG
can influence the characteristics of the network
in a positive manner when DG is located and
sized in an optimal fashion [10] [11] [12] [13].
Locational Value of DG
Overview
The location of DG within the distribution
network affects the value of the DG investment
to both the investor and the network owner
[5]. For the network owner the value of DG is in
its ability to reduce congestion, defer invest-
ment, improve security and increase overall
network efficiency. For the investor the value of
DG is in security of supply, improved price
stability and reduction in energy costs. The
value of the DG investment as realised by both
investor and network owner is dependent on
the location of the DG connection as this
influences the size of installation, type of DG
technology used, connection costs, pricing
policy and avoided costs of investment.
Transmission pricing also has locational factors
that affect the value of DG. In some cases
generation dispatch will optimise against
transmission pricing and in other cases the
electricity market will be the main driver of
dispatch. Transmission and energy costs are
related to each other.
Locational factors also have a dynamic associ-
ated with the timing that energy is generated.
A pricing premium can be expected during
peak loading conditions and in locations where
there is a transmission constraint.
Both investors and network companies aim to
maximise the value of DG to their business but
they approach the problem from different
perspectives. The network company uses
information about their network characteristics
and load profile to influence their connection
and pricing policies. The connection and
pricing policies are designed to encourage DG
investment in the locations where maximum
value is realised for the network company. The
investor uses the connection and pricing
policies of the network company to identify the
locations and investment sizes where they will
maximise their value of DG. The resulting
investment in DG will then alter the characteris-
tics of the network leading ultimately to
changes in connection and pricing policy as
designed by the network company.
Figure 1 illustrates the connections between
the critical factors that influence DG investment
value. The diagram illustrates how location of
DG is crucial in influencing the value of DG to
both investors and network companies.
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DG Technology Type
The location of available resources for energy
production affects the type of generation
technology used for DG investments, particu-
larly if the DG is required at a specific location
e.g. an industrial site. Technology options
include small gas or diesel generators, CHP
and micro gas turbines, renewable technolo-
gies such as photovoltaic’s, wind, hydro and
fuel cells [11] [15].  Where the DG technology
type utilises waste from an industrial process
e.g. CHP or biomass, the location of the waste
resources restricts the location and connection
of DG to the network. Renewable technologies
are particularly restricted by resource location;
wind, solar or hydro DG being particularly
dependent on resource location and/or weather
patterns (dictated by location) [16].
The type of DG technology used affects the
technological impacts of DG connection on the
network. Variable output technologies such as
wind, solar or micro hydro affect the network
by having a variable impact on voltage,
security and load reduction. In contrast, firm
generation from more conventional units, once
connected, creates a less variable impact on
the network. The variable nature of network
impacts affects the value of DG to the network
owner where for example, the non firm
characteristic of wind has less ability to defer
investment (such as transmission substation or
transformer upgrades) than photovoltaic’s or
CHP due to its variable generation nature [9].
The ability of one type of generation to
support another type of installation can result
in the value of both investments being in-
creased. For example, the use of hydro storage
to firm wind generation. A well planned
‘system’ would look at developing DG as a
balanced and diverse portfolio.
Technological Impacts of DG on the
Distribution Network
The technological impacts on the distribution
network are many and well documented in the
previous Chapter. They include load flows,
reactive power flows, line losses, voltage
profile changes, fault levels, power quality and
system security [17]. Whether the technological
impact is detrimental or beneficial to the
network is a direct consequence of the location
of the DG connection [6] [18] [19] [20].
The type of network the DG is connecting to is
an important consideration with regards to the
technological impact of DG investments. This is
Figure 1: Connections between the critical factors that influence DG investment value
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aptly demonstrated in case study analyses
reported in Chapter 5.
Rural networks are often weak with lower
voltages, lower current capabilities in transmis-
sion and voltage issues. Connecting DG in rural
areas can improve voltage profiles [21], but
conductor impedance can limit the ability to
site DG in locations with available resource [22]
or require additional sub-transmission infra-
structure [5].
Urban networks, which tend to be more
interconnected, are more suited to DG due to
the greater transmission and transformer
capacity [22] but the fault level may increase
[23] resulting in required upgrades being
detrimental to the economics of the invest-
ment.  Urban DG has the ability to defer
investment in transmission and transformers
[22] improving the economics of investment.
Whether the overall investment is valuable
from an economic standpoint depends on the
location of investment and the network
characteristics at that location and the negoti-
ated outcome. The characteristics of the
network are largely influenced by the structure
and load profile on the network. DG will often
result in reduced load on the network and
altered network power flows.
Value to Network Company
In determining the value of DG to the network
the benefits and costs of specific investments
must be individually assessed, as benefits may
become costs (and vice versa) depending on
specific details and location of the investment
under consideration. As such, determining the
overall value of DG to the network owner
requires in depth analysis of the proposed
investment and the changes to the network
characteristics due to the DG.
A significant issue is that to date, because of
the low penetration rate DG, impacts have
been typically examined on a case-by case
basis. As the uptake of DG becomes more
intrusive, the benefits of continued DG invest-
ment need to be quantified through study
tools such as simulation, montecarlo analysis
[9], options analysis [24], optimisation algo-
rithms [25], load flow studies and policy
frameworks. No study tool can by itself
quantify the benefits and costs of DG invest-
ment and so many study tools are used
simultaneously.
Different networks have different topology,
characteristics, constraints and load types
resulting in network owners attributing differ-
ent values to the impacts of DG, e.g. a heavily
constrained network may value the ability of
DG to reduce congestion than a lightly loaded
network that would prefer DG be sited at a
location that experiences a high fault level. The
differing objectives of network companies in
encouraging DG mean that a single method of
attributing value to DG is difficult [25] and
could be argued to be undesirable.
For example, one of the major benefits to a
network of DG investment is deferral of
infrastructure investment. An example of how
DG may defer network investment is given in
[9] where DG may reduce the demand at a
constrained feeder by serving local loads,
upstream generation and transmission capacity
may now be able to serve an increased peak
load. The investment deferral is related to a
specific investment and region of the network
indicating the value gained from investment
deferral is highly dependent on the location of
the DG connection. The proximity of DG to load
influences the ability of the DG to defer
network investment.  Where DG supplies load
locally the power flow through the network is
reduced allowing for greater load growth
without network reinforcement [9]. DG also
competes against generation, transmission and
distribution costs giving increased value to DG
that is located close to the load [13].
For a network, and local community it serves,
independence from transmission cost and
electricity price path, remain significant drivers
for change towards more DG. It should be
noted however that this is the result of the
pricing mechanisms that exist. Today’s market
driven electricity system gives little considera-
tion to technical efficiency and other national
benefit issues.
Policy and DG Planning
In assessing the value of DG, the location of
the DG within the network is arguably the most
important factor in determining benefits and
costs to both the investor and the network
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owner. The network owner signals through its
connection and pricing policies the value they
attribute to DG at different locations within the
network [26] and as such are able to influence
the value of DG to the investor by reducing
costs or improving revenue in locations where
DG is valuable.
The policies adopted by network companies
should reflect the location specific nature of DG
by having a location specific tariff structure.
This allows the value of DG to the network to
be adequately recognised [29].  Using pricing
policy to influence DG investors with regard to
location and patterns of network use encour-
age efficient investments and discourage poor
investment or over investment [28].  Patterns
of network use are related to the time of use
nature of distribution networks. Differing DG
technology types have different operating
patterns, some have mostly firm generation,
others non firm or a mix of firm and non firm
[29]. By reflecting the time of use nature of
both DG and demand in pricing policy, the
locations and times where DG is most benefi-
cial to the network can be highlighted [27].
Where network connection and pricing policies
are not efficient at reflecting the value of DG to
the network, the amount of DG deployed
within the network could be adversely im-
pacted, the cost of network investment could
rise and distortions between market partici-
pants could increase [26]. Connection policies
should also reflect the need of the network
owner to adequately distribute DG in locations
within the network that facilitate an overall
efficient system [23] show that diversity in
location and number of DG installations is
important when assessing DG investment as
too many DG connections can adversely affect
the economical efficiencies gained by the
network company.
Issues that hinder efficient policies and delivery
of investment signals to investors, are:
• The bundling of distribution and transmis-
sion charges into energy retailer tariffs. The
charges consumers pay for electricity are
set by retailers.
• Pricing methodology that is based on
energy volume and the cost of production
and delivery.
• A lack of direction until recently with regard
to national policy and energy strategy,
climate change, efficiency, coordinated
governance rules, etc.
Value to Investor
The value of DG to the investor is the balance
between costs of the DG including fuel,
maintenance and installation and the benefits
that can be obtained from the DG e.g. reduced
energy costs, increase in security of supply,
reduced risk from volatile energy prices and
potentially a reduced carbon footprint (if the
DG is renewable). The quantification of value
by the investor is also dependent on the
location of the DG; although in the examples
examined in this study DG was located
proximate to an available (free) fuel source.
Where fuel sources are easily accessible such
as CHP, biomass at landfill etc these locations
have a higher value to the investor as the cost
of operation will be lower. DG may provide
increased security of supply to the load
particularly in radial networks where single
faults can island parts of the distribution
network.
One important factor in assessing the value of
DG to the investor is the connection and
pricing policy of the network to which the DG
wishes to connect. Ideally, the network com-
pany should use its connection and pricing
policies to encourage DG in locations that offer
the optimal benefits to the network in terms of
deferral of investment and improvements in
power quality and security and to discourage
DG in areas where DG would increase costs to
the network [26].
The process for connecting new DG is now
governed by the 2007 Regulations. Pricing
principles covered by the regulations requires
charges to be based on the recovery of
reasonable costs incurred by the distributor to
connect the generator. However, in practice, it
is difficult to envisage how opportunity costs
might be calculated for any DG connection that
acts to reduce overall network efficiency.
DG will have more value to the investor if there
is a favourable connection and pricing policy,
something that should occur at locations
within the network that can obtain the most
benefit from DG. On the other hand, investors
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should nor expect a free ride where their
proposed location is detrimental to network
efficiency.
The regulations [3] are intended to encourage
DG particularly at smaller scale where existing
connection assets are already adequate for DG
to embed behind.
DG has the most value when it forms part of
portfolio of diverse generation facilities.
Network companies can provide operating
functions as a service which overcomes the
operational overhead of starting a generation
business with a single investment.
Location of DG
The location of DG investment and connection
is thus vital for influencing and realising
maximum value in the DG investment for both
the investor and network companies [30].
Where both the investor and network company
can obtain maximum value from a DG invest-
ment, the more likely DG investment will be
undertaken. Experience in The Netherlands has
shown that a ‘win-win’ solution between
network companies and investors, with respect
to DG value, improves penetration of DG within
a distribution network [10].
One of the most important factors influencing
joint maximum value was the geographic
location and concentration of DG. Increased
concentration of DG resulted in reduced costs
to investors, generating an improved economic
return. This in turn improved numbers of sales
and installations of DG units that increased the
concentration of DG within the network [31].
The location of DG is pivotal in influencing
network characteristics and consequently
connection and pricing policies. These polices
are critical in affecting the value of DG to
investors and consequently the locations for
DG connection and investment. The central
nature of location in the DG investment
process implies every investment should be
treated as unique. There is no ‘one size fits all’
solution to the planning process [32].
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4  DG IN NEW ZEALAND
Commercial DG Models
Figure 2 provides an illustration of the com-
plexity of the New Zealand Electricity Market
and the linkages between industry participants.
The continued restructuring of the industry and
evolving regulatory arrangements have been
reflected by new patterns of investment and
activity by the different industry stakeholders.
The figure reinforces the complexity of the
institutional, market and regulatory arrange-
ments, which ultimately govern industry
investments.
Obtaining an optimal solution for the physical
delivery of electricity at least cost within such
an industry framework is thus fraught with
difficulty. The role of DG and the commercial
arrangements that drive DG investments is not
a simple matter.
DG competes with conventional centralised
generation and network capacity expansion
based on costs and strategic needs. DG must
also compete with a range of demand-side
options that can reduce electricity demand
and/or peak capacity requirements in the
transmission and distribution networks.
However demand-side options can also be
used to complement DG investment adding
more diversity and opportunity for
optimisation.
More recently DG is seen as a means of
utilising generation from renewable energy
resources such as wind and small-scale hydro
in situations that would otherwise not be
economic if sized to meet individual demand
alone.
Previous work by CAENZ [1] suggests that DG
investment in New Zealand is likely to have to
embrace systems of less then 1 MWe. This
includes a range of different applications as
follows3:
• Residential owners concerned with improv-
ing energy efficiency and reducing their
energy costs and prepared to invest in
small scale wind, solar or micro hydro
generation.
Figure 2: NZ Electricity supply industry - participants and linkages
3 As customary in the electricity sector 3 types of end-use
categories are used: residential, commercial (including
government & commercial buildings, hospitals, retail/
shopping centres, etc) and industrial
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• Currently topical issues such as climate
change, peak, etc. are encouraging commu-
nities to look at sustainability of energy
supply as community initiatives.
• Large industrial and commercial enterprises
with high energy needs, high security of
supply requirements and/or those that
operate technology suitable for
cogeneration plant operation. Pricing risk is
often a consideration as generation is a
form of energy market hedge. Having a
host load is often required and heat may
be the dominant energy element.
• Other industrial and commercial owners of
backup generation purchased for their own
stand-by or emergency supplies.
• Lines Company investments in network
reinforcement or to support network
diversity. Generally these investment form
part of normal asset management strategy.
Consideration of alternative solutions is a
prescribed Asset Management process.
• Isolated residential or small scale units eg.
Rural settlements or agricultural industries.
Distributed generation may give these
investors cheaper energy and/or a more
reliable supply by avoiding network
connection costs. These are sometimes
referred to as Remote Area Power Supplies
or RAPS. Governance of these systems lie
outside the regulations.
• Institutional owners such as District Council
trading entities or other public entities to
improve energy utilisation or reduce energy
costs.
DG projects of the size and applications listed
above are likely to have the following connec-
tion characteristics:
1. Non-export DG-projects behind existing
load. These projects generate less than the
energy requirement of the load at the site
and therefore have no or very little energy
surplus to export. The value of the energy
generated is basically the net retail price of
the replaced electricity.  From a commercial
perspective no export contract is necessary
assuming technical standard compliance is
procured through retail energy contracts.
From a network perspective, the DG-project
cannot be seen, but for the reduction in
load and no specific DG-connection
contract is necessary. However, if well
managed, the DG-project can significantly
reduce load peaks, with potential advan-
tages for both the network company
(reduced network peaks) and the host load
(via reduced peaks, i.e. reduced costs).
Where network tariffs are based on energy
volumes distributed and not costs; reduced
import volumes can mean significantly
lower income for the network company.
At the network level such investments
create a distortion to efficient investment
within the network. If the network company
already has a high investment sunk into
the connection capacity for much larger
import volumes or peaks, and this still
needs to be maintained in case installed
DG plant is malfunctioning, the network
company may not be willing to reduce
connection charges. Most cogen-projects
fall into this category and as such benefits
from the investment are rarely fully real-
ised. Small, residential PV and solar water
heating systems would generally also fall
into this category.
2. Part import, part export generator. This
typically covers projects with significant
variation in load and/or generation. In this
case import and export both occur. The
average value of the energy generated is
somewhere between the net retail price of
the replaced electricity and the wholesale
sales price. If connection capacity is sized
for maximum import requirement then
generation export will be constrained to the
same peak capacity. Both import and
export need to be metered separately
(under present rules) and a contract for
both streams is necessary with a retailer
(generally the same) unless size allows
direct sale to the wholesale market. There
will generally be a spread between the
import and export tariffs to cover retailer
margin and risk.
The timing of when generation is available
and when load is peaking relative to the
wholesale market can deliver significant
premiums. When prices are high windfall
profit may result from increasing the level
of base loading.
From a network perspective, there is little
justification for an import-export connection
to be treated differently in terms of
connection capacity as the cost of the
connection asset generally doesn’t change
if it is for power flows in both directions as
compared to import only (except with
respect to fault level currents, islanding,
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switch off during maintenance and possibly
areas with significant DG where total max
export can be larger than total import).
Regulation prevents network companies
charges for generation connection assets
when no actual additional investment is
required i.e. cannot charge for the use of
an existing connection. Landfill/sewerage
gas and some cogeneration plants fall into
this category, as well as industrial custom-
ers with intermittent generation.
3. Export-only DG-projects. This includes most
small-hydro, wind and (small) geothermal
plants. Commercially these projects have to
sell their production at wholesale price
(unless they can manage a contract with
another user within the same distribution
network), which is generally significantly
lower than retail prices. Network companies
are limited in their ability to trade energy
directly to consumers and so network
company-owned DG investments can only
sell their output to retailers who generally
own competing generation.
Network companies therefore have a
reluctance to investing in DG unless there
are strong network benefits to be gained.
These are the projects where DG-connection
rules have the most impact, as specific
connections generally have to be made and
locations are often remote. Connection
costs can therefore be high.
It is this category where much of the
present regulatory debate is focused with
respect to regulated retail and connection
contracts. A relatively large number of these
projects have been installed in New
Zealand in the past. Significant opportunity
still exists and needs to be unlocked if New
Zealand wants to use its renewable energy
potential to the maximum. However,
challenges with these projects are also
large, as generation resources are generally
intermittent (i.e. not providing reliable
network benefits), capacity utilisation is
low, i.e. high network capacity per pro-
duced energy; and many of these projects
are in areas remote from network access,
where generation resources are available
but with higher probability of technical and
economic connection issues.
4. Back-up and peak-lopping (diesel/gas) gen-
sets. Generally existing for backup; some-
times used for peak-lopping (consumer
peaks); can also be used for network
support (network peak-lopping) and
transmission cost management. This type
of plant can also be used to firm other
generation, such as wind and hydro with
limited storage if managed as part of
generation portfolio. Plants need to run
occasionally for operational reliability.
5. Investments in diesel gensets specifically
for network support purposes: these can be
either fixed or mobile and include stand-
alone gensets for network support during
outages and maintenance back-up activi-
ties. Many network companies have one or
two of these gensets available on stand-by.
Currently there is sufficient DG penetration and
market maturity to be witnessing the applica-
tion of DG to secondary opportunities. For
example at a small GXP’s a generation facility
in the 1-5MW size band (or a number facilities
summating to this size) may be able to export
to grid particularly when demand is very low in
the early hours of morning. The 5MW Waihi
Hydro Scheme at Wairoa exports approximately
200,000kWh’s back into grid per annum.
Industry rules need to consider this reality
without imposing excessive hurdles for such
small volumes that might result in unnecessary
hydro spill.
In this respect DG is penalised by treating it on
a stand-alone basis. Instead, it should be
treated as adding diversity to the load base
and recognised that it can add value to the
whole system. CAENZ studies strongly suggest
that DG should also be considered as part of a
portfolio of all generation connected to a
network where it can add value to other
generation investments.
It is important also to note that NZ has a very
concentrated energy market with approximately
1% of customers accounting for approximately
70% of the total industrial and commercial
load. Members of the Major Electricity Users
Group (some 20 plus firms) constitute nearly
30% of all demand in New Zealand [33] and
produce nearly 1200 GWh/y of their own
generation. Mostly this generation is used on
site through co-gen plants or diesel generators
in order to reduce their electricity require-
ments. A number of these users have the
ability to offer their load reduction services to
the reserve markets or surplus generation to
the wholesale electricity market pool. Notable
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is that in the last decade or so the contracted
interruptible (industrial) load has increased
from ca 150 to ca. 550 MW4.
Existing Distributed
Generation in NZ
There is considerable existing distributed
generation presently, although exact amounts
vary. According to the MED [34], DG is presently
contributing to about 15% to 20% of our
electricity supply. Annex 1 provides an overview
of known connected DG-installations that add
up to around 12% of generation capacity in
New Zealand. It is also estimated by CAENZ
that about 8% of electricity consumed is from
on-site cogeneration [1], not connected.
These numbers are subject to significant
uncertainty, as early DG investments have
occurred largely on an informal basis. Existing
DG-installations have been installed in New
Zealand in roughly four ‘waves’:
• First electricity (municipal) suppliers before
interconnected system (<1940): hydro or
steam turbines5
• The second wave of DG in New Zealand
came with government support for the
construction of small (around 30 MWe)
hydro schemes that some Power Boards
and Municipal Electricity Departments were
encouraged to build during the 1950s and
later.
• Industrial co-generation facilities were the
third wave of DG. These projects typically
involved large-scale investments, mostly
gas-fired, and which still contribute to a
significant share of the DG market. This
market remains under exploited with quite
attractive niche opportunities involving
smaller scale generation yet to be ex-
ploited. Co-generation has been largely
based on diesel as a fuel, landfill gas and
some natural gas.
• The present use of diesel standby sets as
exemplified in the Orion case study is the
main thrust of recent DG investment to
assist in managing network peak load
constraints. There is a substantial amount
of standby plant already installed. The
capital cost is sunk and furthermore there
is a need for these installations to be
tested at intervals to ensure reliable
operation.
With the reinforcement of Government renew-
able energy policy we are now seeing a new
(potential) wave in DG based on renewable
energy forms (especially wind, solar, small-
scale hydro and geothermal). This is being
actively promoted by government.
Anecdotally, it would appear that there are
large numbers of new distributed generation
projects at the development, pre-development
and conceptual stage. But whether these come
to fruition remains to be seen. A few of those
known to CAENZ are outlined below to indicate
the variety of potential distributed generation
options.
• Windflow Technology, a manufacturer of
wind turbines, has in the recent past built a
pre-production 500kW windmill at Gebbies
Pass, near Christchurch. It is now progress-
ing a wind farm project, at a site near
Palmerston North and promoting develop-
ment at a number of other sites around
New Zealand.
• Genesis Power is now in the process of
developing an 18 MW wind farm on Awhitu
Peninsula, south of Auckland. The company
is also currently constructing a 90MW
cogeneration plant with Norske Skog at its
Kawerau Mill, burning biomass and gas to
supply steam and electricity to the site.
• Meridian Energy is investigating a number
of potential windfarm options, including a
joint venture with Comalco to assess the
potential for a windfarm at Tiwai Point. It
has recently commissioned the first stage
of its Whitehills wind farm and is in the
consenting process for its large grid
connected project Hayes in Central Otago
and the West Wind site near Wellington. It
is investigating using wind energy to
balance its hydro capacity.
4 From CAENZ [1]; “sustained (1 minute) and the fast (under
5 seconds) interruptible response. A summary of the
maximum quantity of interruptible load currently procured
by the system Operator is approximately (2003):
Island    Fast (FIR)         Sustained (SIR)
North     344 MW             804 MW
South       45 MW              90 MW
Note that it is up to each Service Provider to determine
whether or not they wish to offer their maximum quantity
of interruptible load when trading on the spot market.
5 New Zealand. The first introduction of electricity at
Reefton in 1888 was from local dedicated hydro electricity
generating plant. Electricity was generated and supplied
for local consumption. The technologies were either hydro
or steam turbine.
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• Northpower owns and operates the Wairua
(3MW) hydroelectric power station near
Titoki. It has undertaken studies into the
feasibility of extending the power station to
increase its capacity to 8-12MW.
Northpower has also investigated a 10-
20MW wind-generation power station.
• WEL Networks and Green Energy have
announced a joint project to build a 1MW
plant that will use Horotiu Landfill gas
(near Hamilton) to generate electricity.
Hamilton City Council will supply the gas
and buy back the electricity.
• Unison Network is considering investment
in a range of projects ranging from 500kW
to 2MW capacity. It has announced it is
investigating a wind-driven power scheme
at Te Pohue, on the Napier-Taupo highway.
• Centralines and Meridian Energy are
investigating a 10MW hydro-electric power
scheme near Otane, central Hawke’s Bay,
with associated irrigation. Any scheme
would be several years away.
• The Wairoa District Council is investigating
new power station options to meet a
needed 2 to 3 MW additional capacity for
the Wairoa District. Options being investi-
gated include: a 3MW wind farm at Mahia;
a new hydro power station on the Mohaka;
a gas turbine in association with the
development of Wairoa gas; installation of
a 3MW steam turbine generator to an
existing boiler at the Affco-Wairoa plant;
and installation of a 10MW steam boiler
with a 2.6MW turbogenerator, powered by
biowaste, at the Solid Timber Building
Systems Plant, Wairoa.
DG Regulatory Environment
Current Status of DG Regulation
The government announced in May 2003 their
intention to regulate minimum terms and
conditions for connection of distributed
generation. The electricity Governance (Connec-
tion of Distributed Generation) Regulations
came into force on 30 August 2007.
Some of the main aspects covered by the
Regulations include:
• Specified process for obtaining approval to
connect and regulated terms that apply to
exemptions to connection contracts entered
into outside the regulated terms.
• Disputes resolution processes.
• The need for distributors to act at arms
length regardless of ownership or beneficial
interest.
• Transistional provisions.
There are also 5 Schedules to the Regulations
covering important aspects such as:
• Processes, including timeframes, for
obtaining approval to connect.
• Regulated terms for connection of DG in
the absence of contractually agreed terms.
• Default dispute resolution process.
• Pricing principles.
• Prescribed maximum fees.
The purpose of the regulations is to enable
connection of distributed generation where
connection is consistent with connection and
operation standards. The regulations set out
pricing principles covering issues such as:
• Incremental costs of connection less
avoided/avoidable costs.
• Approaches to avoided costs.
• Incentives for others to free-ride where
generators pay for spare capacity.
The approach used is an incremental cost
approach. Generators are expected to pay the
incremental costs of connection to the net-
work, less any avoided/avoidable cost benefit
the generator brings by connecting.  Incremen-
tal costs are net of transmission and distribu-
tion costs that an efficient service provider
would be able to avoid as a result of the
connection of the distributed generation.
Part of the issues surrounding the treatment of
these costs is the requirement that a second
(or further) generator that connects to the
distribution network and utilises a network
upgrade financed by the first generator must
pay for a portion of the network upgrade as
financed by the first generator. This payment
back to the first generator is suggested to be
paid by the distribution company by means of
a reduction in connection charges. Distribution
companies are hesitant about this requirement
due to costs incurred in administering it and
the unknown calculation methods. Calculating
the payment could easily be disputed.
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In addition to the above the Electricity Commis-
sion has published its expectations [35] on the
terms and conditions that should apply
between retailers and domestic consumers
being supplied delivered electricity under an
interposed agreement. It has also published its
expectations on the terms and conditions that
should apply for the purchase of small sur-
pluses of electricity from small scale distrib-
uted generation [36].
Retailer involvement in distributed generation
is via the purchase of electricity that is injected
into the distribution network. Often the retailer
will only purchase at the spot price from the
nearest GXP, especially if the GXP is not
constrained in any way. Expecting the retailer
to pay more for distributed generation would
only be viable where the distributed generation
can facilitate the opportunity for the retailer to
increase their energy sales, perhaps through
reducing capacity constraints in the distribution
network or encouraging more demand usage.
MED in their 2003 discussion document [34]
noted that this barrier particularly affects
renewable energy sourced generation; such as
wind, small hydro and solar generation, as
guarantees cannot be given on stable supply.
Renewable distributed generation is often non-
firm generation where it is difficult to contract
for a set amount of energy injection when the
method of electricity production is intermittent
e.g. solar, or wind. This makes the agreement
of a sale and purchase contract between
retailer and distributed generator difficult to
obtain. There are, however, indications that
some retailers are willing to be flexible with
the Photovoltaic Association (now incorporated
as part of the Sustainable Electricity Associa-
tion New Zealand) having negotiated a zero
spread arrangement for residential DG with
Contact. That is Contact will pay the retail price
for fed-back electricity for < 5kW residential
installations
DG Pricing Structures
Basically, there are two main options for
obtaining an energy supply contract for DG,
one is offering the energy to the clearing
manager and selling into the electricity market
pool the second is to negotiate a contract with
a retailer for direct sale, i.e. obtain a physical
supply contract at pre-arranged prices [37].
Selling to the clearing manager is unrealistic
for small distributed generation due to the tiny
amounts of power being sold and the prohibi-
tive financial requirements of being a market
participant. Negotiating a contract for sale to a
retailer is the most suitable option but anecdo-
tal reports indicate this may not be easy to
achieve at desired price levels. New Zealand’s
major retailers are mostly ‘gentailers’, compa-
nies that own both generation and retail
operations. These companies have a natural
hedge with themselves resulting in a thin
hedge market. The demand for hedges is often
small with retailers not willing to pay someone
else for energy that they themselves can
produce.
In situations where contracts are successfully
negotiated, the price paid for energy supplied
is often very close to the wholesale clearing
price of the closest GXP node, resulting in the
retailer capturing the entire retail margin on the
energy and the distributed generator making a
loss, or very little profit.   Distributed genera-
tion is often more expensive to produce due to
its small scale nature and the wholesale price
is often below the cost of generation.
This is an allocative issue, wh
ere the retailer treats the energy price as if it is
being delivered at the GXP and will still incur
the costs of distribution across a network and
wide customer base. On the other hand, the
DG investor sees generation as targeted to a
specific load within the network.
If the distribution network GXP capacity is
unconstrained, then receiving the wholesale
price for DG seems reasonable as why should a
retailer pay more for distributed generation
when they could pay less (the going price) and
get it from the grid. Conversely, if the distribu-
tion network is constrained in some way and
the DG is able to supply more customers than
otherwise, they should receive a premium for
this service to the retailer.
Network Connection Charges
In this study we have used the case study
examples to review the different ways in which
distribution networks apply connection and use
of system charges and their impacts on the
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economic viability of the selected case studies.
The regulations limit connection charges to a
reasonable estimate of the portion of capital
investment and operating costs that the
connection of the distributed generator has
contributed to, as well as an assessment of
any consequential avoided costs. These costs
and assessments may include both shallow
and deep connection costs.
One issue facing the DG investor is that
transmission charges are a ‘pass-through’ cost
to the local distribution companies and it is
often difficult for the investor to realise this
value as a revenue stream to their own project.
Currently the distribution company receive the
reduction in interconnection charges, which are
normally passed through into reduced revenue
requirements in setting charges to retailers.
Depending on the contract between the
distribution company and the distributed
generation owner that distributed generator
may receive all, part or none of those savings.
Allocation of these costs will always be
difficult.
For the distribution companies to be able to
rely on such a generation solution then there
needs to be an obligation on the generator not
to withdraw their solution if they are to expect
a full share of the benefits created. This, again,
can be difficult to guarantee.
Another key issue is the application of the Grid
Investment Test process that applies at
present. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the
current interpretation of the test creates a bias
towards transmission solutions to the detri-
ment of DG solutions. Orion, for example,
report [38] that a 10 MW DG investment was
not able to proceed through not being able to
arrive at satisfactory contractual arrangements
with the Electricity Commission.  Instead, it
should be possible to offer DG operators long
term contracts for transmission support that
allows DG solutions specifically targeting
transmission constraints. Transmission pricing
locks in long term benefits for line solutions
via sunk cost recovery (i.e. charge for lines
even though they may subsequently become
redundant) but yet won’t guarantee long term
positions for generation solutions. The invest-
ment risk position is, thus, substantially
biased.
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5  CASE STUDY ANALYSIS
Six differing DG investments are presented here
as case studies. They represent a cross section
of the technology types, operational character-
istics and locational aspects of DG invest-
ments. The studies are considered in three
groups, each group representing a network
company. Each study is presented from the
point of view of the investor, investigating
costs, revenue, connection pricing and charges,
taxes and the return on investment period.
Powerco Case Study
General Parameters of Case Study
The Powerco case studies are two examples of
independent DG investment within the network
without line company interest. Powerco itself
has little interest in furthering DG on its
network due, in some extent to:
• The robust nature of its network as
benchmarked against its asset management
objectives i.e. it considers its security and
reliability performance adequate. DG
investment is of little use to Powerco for
reinvestment or capacity reasons across the
majority of its network and so it would see
little point in encouraging DG investment in
locations where it does not provide a
benefit to the company.
• Current levels of DG on its network and
interest from third parties suggest that line
company interest is not required to
facilitate the development of DG.
• Transmission constraints aren’t strong
drivers in this case and the commercial
imperatives of this company treat transmis-
sion as a pass-through cost issue.
• Regulatory control of the company prevents
it achieving the use of capital investment
hurdles required by its owners and it has
other less regulated investment opportuni-
ties available to it (including Australia).
There is an exception to the above, the East
part of the network (especially Coromandel),
which is constrained.
Description of Line Company
Powerco is the 2nd biggest gas and electricity
network company in New Zealand (by customer
connections) and the largest in length, and the
only one that is completely owned by a public-
listed company (BBI). Powerco is also develop-
ing a gas distribution and retailing division in
Tasmania. BBI is a major global owner of
transport and energy infrastructure (Europe,
USA, Australia, New Zealand).
Powerco’s Mission Statement is “to provide
safe, reliable and economically efficient
electricity and gas network distribution services
whilst achieving sustainable earnings” [39].
Description of Network
Powerco’s distribution network covers the
upper-central, central and lower areas of the
North Island, providing energy to approximately
400,000 consumers; this represents 46% of
New Zealand’s gas connections and 16% of its
Table 5.1: Network Characteristics for Powerco (Source: Powerco’s AMP and disclosures)
Consumer connections 304,471 customers  (electricity network only) 
Network area – 
Lines and Cables 27,000 km 
Number of GXPs 25 
Zone Substations 101 
Total electricity 4,201 GWH 
Peak demand 677 MW 
Load factor 75.7 % 
Connection density 11.24 connections per km of line 
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electricity connections. The region covers
Taranaki, Wanganui, Rangitikei,
Manawatu,,Wairarapa, South Waikato,
Tauranga, Thames Valley and Coromandel
regions. The network, itself, serves a range of
demands from isolated rural areas to major
cities and industrial zones such as Kinleith
Pulp and Paper Mill and the Tauranga Port.
The specifics of the network are given in Table
5.1.
Due to “confidentiality and commercial sensi-
tivity” Powerco does not provide detailed
information of its large customers. Clearly, one
such customer will be the Kinleith Pulp and
Paper Mill, which has its own 11kV distribution
network consisting of 58 km of overhead lines.
The Powerco network is larger and more
dispersed than many other networks in the
country. Unique features include: (a) the
network is geographically dispersed and (b)
the company is limited in respect of its ability
to optimise the network as a whole. Thus DG
investment can only be looked at from a
localised perspective.
The network is best considered as two regions
due to different growth patterns across the
north island. The eastern region is more
dynamic and Powerco expects annual electricity
volume and peak demand to grow at 3.9% and
3.2%, respectively, until 2008. The western
region is expected to have slower growth at a
rate of 1.0% and 0.9%, respectively. In this
regard the Coromandel region is the most
favoured area for DG investment, due to its
high growth, limited infrastructure and sea-
sonal peak demands associated with holiday
making. Other areas of the network are more
robust and thus far less attractive for DG from
a Powerco perspective.
The two case studies that are looked at here
are based in Palmerston North (Manawatu) and
Wanganui, both areas of low demand growth.
This suggests that these areas are not ideal for
DG investment from the company perspective.
According to Powerco’s AMP [39] the present
network configuration allows some operational
flexibility, but the level of security provided in
some areas does not comply with Powerco’s
security of supply criteria. They make the
following points:
• Taranaki, Manawatu and Wairarapa regions
have most of their substations at or near
the security level required by Powerco
standards. They have the required backup
capacity in transformers, and their trans-
former utilisations lie between 55% and
56%;
• Wanganui security levels are lower, with 7
of its 15 substations currently at A2
(without supply for repair time) security. As
transformer capacity for backup has not
been provided in these cases, utilisation is
higher at 62%;
• At Tauranga, 3 of 12 substations have A2
security, and utilisation is 73%;
• In the Valley Region, 16 of the 27 substa-
tions have A2 security, and transformer
utilisation is 82%; and,
• Many substations have lower than desired
security levels. Those that are only margin-
ally lower will be upgraded along with
other substation work, but urgent attention
is being given to those supplying industrial
or commercial loads.
Note that Powerco describes A2 security as
“supply [that] may be lost in the event of the
outage of one major element of the
subtransmission network. Supply cannot be
restored until the faulty element is repaired or
replaced”.
Security provision is therefore interpreted as
tending towards that expected in a rural
network with limited interconnection opportu-
nity. This is below that expected in urban
networks. Powerco has an average connection
density at the high end of the range for rural
networks but also supplies some relatively
large regional cities. One issue with large
networks with a lot of diversity is that their
disclosed performance can average out quite
poor service delivery in some locations. Further
disclosure information is not normalised
between networks and therefore is invalid for
comparing one network to another.
Network reliability is higher in urban areas
where connection density is greater (due to
lower economic and technical constraints), thus
in areas of greater demand faults are able to
be dealt with quickly, in areas of low density
reliability can be poor.
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Network Issues
A particular feature of the Powerco network is
its vulnerability (design robustness) to weather
events and the geographic challenges these
can present to fault response.
Adverse weather events can have a material
impact on reliability for any network. One can
assume that such events will be of longer
duration than typically would be seen for other
forms of outage. However, the question that
arises is the extent to which these factors are
properly addressed in engineering design and
work practices. DG investment/stand-by-power
may be appropriate for the more remote or
stringy parts of the network for realising
uniformed resilience and reliability. Further DG
can offer low cost alternatives to security than
network duplication and interconnection.
In this instance Powerco operates to a commer-
cial mandate where there are no requirements
to be delivering minimum standards of security
and reliability only to maintain service levels
relative to pricing path.
Powerco is having to address much stronger
growth in the Tauranga and Thames Valley
networks (Eastern Region) compared to its
network in the southern North Island (Western
Region). Furthermore, growth in the Western
Region has been slow with most growth
restricted to urban localities. In the Eastern
Region a broader growth pattern is seen;
growth is caused by urban development,
energy intensive and seasonal dairy practises,
and the increasing trend of this region of the
country to be used as a holiday or life-style
destination.
Growth related to holidaymakers tends to
create short-term load peaks restricted to
holiday periods and weekends. Over recent
times growth in peak demand has been
observed to outstrip growth in energy use, the
exception to this has been the eastern side of
the Coromandel Peninsula and the southern
Wairarapa. Peaky and low duration loads can
fail to generate sufficient new revenues (via
energy related tariffs) to fund network capacity
upgrades. Areas that can’t justify investment to
Table 5.2: DG within the Powerco-Network (Source: ???????)
Company Site Name Export Capacity 
Ballance  Agri-Nutrients Kapuni Urea Manufacturing Plant 2.6MW (non-export) Generator 
Cheal - (Austral Pacific) Cheal - (Austral Pacific) 0.6 MW  
Drysdale Hydro Drysdale Hydro 150kVA  
Genesis Energy Hau Nui Wind Farm 3.7MW  
Genesis Energy Hau Nui Wind Farm 3.7MW  
Genesis Energy Kourarau Hydro 0.9MW  
New Zealand Energy Opunaki Hydro 320kVA  
New Zealand Energy Ratahei Hydro 220kVA 
NZ Windfarms NZ Windfarms ?unknown 
PNCC Turitea Hydro 180KW  
PNCC Totara Road Hydro 1MW  
PNCC Landfill Gas 1 MW 
Swift Energy NZ Ltd Rimu Production Station 1.2MW  
Trustpower Generator Tararua Northern Wind Farm 34MW  
Trustpower Generator Mangorei Hydro 4.5MW  
Trustpower Generator Patea Hydro 31.4MW  
Trustpower Generator Tararua Southern Wind Farm 34MW  
Trustpower Generator Motukawa Hydro 4.6MW  
Trustpower Generator Little - Motukawa Hydro 300kVA  
Ballance  Agri-Nutrients Mount Maunganui Plant Non-export Generator 
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meet demand peaks are even less likely to
justify investment in security.
Holidaymakers who come from cities expect
city service levels and don’t want their holidays
impaired by power supply issues. Reliance on
tariffs based on energy volumes and not asset
cost, contribute to this issue.  In these circum-
stances DG can sometimes provide lower cost
solutions.
According to Powerco’s AMP [39] there is a
capacity shortfall in the Tauranga network that
is being dealt with by building a new switching
station at Hairini and upgrading GXPs.
DG Profile within the Network
Although the Powerco-network has most of the
existing NZ wind farm capacity connected to it
(Manawatu and Wairarapa regions) and several
small-scale hydro and cogen-installations
(totalling more than 125 MW, see below),
Distributed Generation is – at present – not a
major contributor to Powerco operations, i.e. it
tends to be owned and operated by other parties
and therefore is not necessarily optimised to
address network operating objectives.
It is also worth noting that the number of DG-
connection requests received over the last three
years is approximately 1 per month (this is
higher than before), but DG-projects are
installed only at the rate of 1 or 2 per year.
Independent generation investors face the
hurdle of firstly establishing a network connec-
tion but more significantly resolving energy
trading or energy purchase agreements with
retailers. This is an issue of coordinating these
requirements which a lay person struggles to
achieve and there is a lack of support capability
within consulting, network, and retailer organi-
sations to support investors i.e. the industry as
a whole does not present a coordinated,
consistent, ‘one stop’ shop for DG investors.
Until a few years ago no clear, uniform Powerco
policy existed with regard to the connection
criteria and tariffs for DG. This is a common
scenario across the country as networks who
haven’t been asked to connect DG haven’t
necessarily thought it through. The necessity of
a robust connection and pricing policy in
signalling DG value to both investors and
network companies has been detailed in the DG
literature. Where policy is new, untested or
under development there is greater uncertainty
for both investor and network company in
assessing long term benefits and value of DG,
potentially reducing or limiting uptake of
investment opportunities.  This issue is even
more exaggerated in small networks where
there is less probability of those within the
community capable of initiating such a proposal
and less expertise within the line company to
consider the possibility or support the proposal.
In 2006 (in the context of MED signalling its
itention to regulate) a new policy [40] was
developed after consultation and coordination
with, among others, Vector and Orion. The tariff
base is set out below, but includes rebates for
Avoided Costs of Transmission (ACOT) and
rebates for peak generation in constrained areas.
Powerco has briefly investigated installing
diesel-gensets in the Eastern Region (especially
Coromandel Peninsula), where network con-
straints are highest from demand peaks in the
summer tourist season. However, ACOT alone
wouldn’t warrant such investments and
Resource Management issues are also deemed
to be significant, especially for permanent
installations. It is a recognised that in future
when network upgrades become necessary in
this area, postponing lines investment could
tip the balance towards some incremental DG
investment. Powerco’s interest in encouraging
DG in this and some other constrained areas
(particularly Tauranga and Coromandel) is
clearly reflected in their DG-policy.
Powerco also states that where a long line
connects to a limited load they intend not to
replace these lines, but rather investigate
alternatives such as local generation. There are
10-20 locations on the entire network where
this would be considered. The consumer’s right
to supply can override decision making on the
basis of least cost most efficient solution.
Powerco DG policy
The ‘PowerCo Distributed Generation (DG)
policy (2006)’ is set out below. The policy is
split into 3 categories:
• Connections < 10 kW
• Connections 10 kW to 1 MW
• Connections > 1 MW
Conditions and tariffs for connections greater
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than 1 MW will always be calculated on a
project-specific basis, but the pricing principles
are similar to that which applies for 10 kW to 1
MW installations. The procedure for connec-
tions less than 10 kW is a simplified version of
the other two categories. In this document we
will therefore only discuss the policy for
connections 10 kW to 1 MW.
Procedure connections >10 kW
A Enquiry
At this stage many developers don’t yet know
the exact nameplate capacity and technical
configuration of installation. The aim is to
establish the main technical issues especially
relating to capacity of line in question, maxi-
mum demand and potential voltage issues;
and the order of magnitude for connection
costs and potential rebates.
B Specific studies
Depending on the size of the installation and
the state of the network in the connection
area, the next stage in many cases involves a
more specific load flow study to establish
influence and conditions of connection. These
studies are done at the cost to the developer
proposing the DG-installation (with 10 free
Powerco-hours). If the generator is small (often
< 500 kW) and network capacity in the area is
Table 5.3: Powerco’s Substation Location Rebates (Source: Powerco DG Policy)
Akura E Hatricks Wharf E Milson A Taupo Quay C 
Alfredton A Hau Nui D Morrinsville E Tauranga 
City 
E 
Aongatete E Inglewood  A Motukawa E Te Ore Ore E 
Arahina E Kai Iwi A Ngariki A Te Puke C 
Awatoitoi A Kairanga A Norfolk C Thames T1 A 
Baird Rd B Kaponga B Omokoroa E Thames 
T2&T3 
D 
Beach Rd D Kapuni E Otumoetai D Tinui C 
Bell Block A Kauri Point A Paeroa D Tirau E 
Blink Bonnie A Keith St A Papamoa E Tower Rd E 
Browne St E Kelvin Grove A Parkville A Triton E 
Bulls A Kempton E Pascal St A Tuhitarata E 
Cambria D Kerepehi E Piako D Turitea A 
Cardiff A Kimbolton D Pohokura A Waihapa A 
Castlecliff A Lake Rd E Pongakawa A Waihi E 
Chapel D Lakeside + 
Midway 
A Pongaroa A Waihi Beach E 
City E Livingstone C Pukepapa A Waihi Rd A 
Clareville A Main St A Pungarehu A Waiouru A 
Cloton Rd A Manaia A Putaruru D Waitara East A 
Coromandel E Mangamutu E Rata  A Waitara 
West 
A 
Douglas A Maraetai Rd B Roberts Ave B Waitoa A 
Eltham C Martinborough A Sanson A Walton E 
Farmers Rd C Matatoki B Tahuna E Wanganui 
East 
D 
Featherston C Matua D Taihape A Welcome 
Bay 
C 
Feilding A McKee A Tairua E Whangamata E 
Gladstone E Mikkelsen Rd E Tasman B Whareroa A 
      Whitianga E 
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more than sufficient (and no expected voltage
issues), no detailed load flow studies are
required. However, protection systems will
always be reviewed to ensure disconnection
during faults and maintenance.
Generators above 500kW are always required
to have a SCADA-connection so that the
control room can see in real time what the
generator is doing to ensure there are no
safety concerns – and to understand growth
and loading issues in the local area.
C Contracting
If the DG developer wants to go ahead, a
proposal and contract are developed. Installa-
tions under 1 MW derive from a standard policy
with connection tariffs and rebates per substa-
tion and ACOT calculated per GXP (see Table
5.3). The main aspects of this policy are:
• New assets specific for the generator are to
be paid by the generator. However, often
the developers provide for the equipment
to be finally owned and maintained by the
lines company.
• No fixed connection charges (i.e. charge/day).
• The connection charge rate per region
(eastern or western). Powerco’s western
region is $9.50/kW/month (less in eastern
region).  The charge is determined using an
average of the 12 highest peaks (one per
day) over a rolling 12-month period for the
generator.6
• Location rebate: $/kW of generation
Coincident with Maximum Demand (average
12 highest peaks). The rebate per kW varies
per Powerco-substation depending on the
expected capacity usage for different
substations as projected in the medium
term Asset Management Plan; the catego-
ries vary from A (sufficient spare capacity
for the coming years and no rebate) to F
(highest rebate because substation is
expected to be loaded at more than 100%
in short term).7, 8
Currently there is no overview readily available
which describes DG potential for various parts
of Powerco network. For the Taranaki region
EECA has undertaken a ‘Renewable Energy
Assessment’ [41] potential assessment which
describes the region as follows:
• Wave energy in the thousand MW range,
ignoring environmental constraints and
conflicts with other maritime users.
• Approximately 300 MW of wind capacity,
depending on the degree of acceptance of
adverse effects.
• Less than one million litres per year of
ethanol for transport fuel from grain crops
currently grown in the region. About 10
million litres per year of ethanol or 40 GWh
per year of electrical energy from woody
biomass derived from lower-grade forestry.
• Remaining hydro potential of about 60 MW,
in mini, small, and medium scale projects
lying outside the Department of Conserva-
tion land or Native Forest areas, compared
to the existing installed capacity of 47 MW.
• Significant potential for solar thermal hot
water systems, considerably less for solar
photovoltaic.
It must be commented however that no
account of technology maturity and economic
performance was taken into account in the
EECA studies and therefore the above esti-
mates should be severely discounted as they
are unlikely to be realised in the near to
medium team at least. There may be some
small hydro potential but again the proximity
to the network, resolving consent issues and
share economics make it unlikely that the full
potential will be realised.
An evaluation later in this report regarding the
Network Tasman hydro case study further
reinforces the view that the current legislative
climate in New Zealand is not conducive to
these types of investments.
Case Studies
Palmerston North City Council landfill
gas generation
Palmerston North City Sewerage Treatment
Plant has installed a gas-powered engine
(Deutz-Germany) fed with recovered gas from
the landfill (ca. 50% CH4). The engine drives a
6 Generation behind load is to be charged on the higher of
Load Anytime Demand (average 12 highest peaks) or
Generation Anytime Demand (average 12 highest peaks).
7 Each zone substation on the Powerco network is assigned
a location rebate grouping. These groups are determined
by the utilisation of the zone substation and what benefit
Powerco would see from connection of generation to that
particular zone substation.
8 Only available where the Generation Coincident Demand
exceeds the Load Anytime Demand and limited to a
maximum, equivalent to the connection charge.
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1.2 MVA (1 MWe) Marelli synchronous generator
with automatic voltage regulation. Total
efficiency is ca. 40%. Expected minimum load
factor is 90%.
The project was commissioned and started
generating in February 2006.The scheme is
owned and operated by Energen and connects
to the Powerco network at the Kairanga
substation.
Since commissioning it has had problems with
its gas wells being damaged due to on-going
operational activities at the landfill site. The
generator has therefore been running at much
lower capacity than expected. There have also
been problems in metering and billing and
PNCC has not been charged under the new
tariff system – yet.
The generator has been connected to an
existing load connection of the Sewerage
Treatment Plant, approximately 9.5 km from
Kairanga substation, feeding into Linton-0331
GXP. Kairanga substation is not a constrained
Powerco zone (A-zone) and therefore the
project has not been attributed any location
rebates by Powerco. Linton GXP already has a
considerable amount of DG-generation (espe-
cially wind farms) and ACOT is expected to be
limited ($3.95 per kW when available).
Before installation of the distributed generator
the treatment plant had an installed load
capacity (at maximum demand) of 900 KVA. 12-
month average load peak was expected to
lower to 600 kW.
The generator is expected to have a maximum
generation peak of 700 kW for the first year
(potentially to increase as landfill gas produc-
tion increases). Generation system Coincident
peak is expected to be 500 kW.
The scheme is charged a network connection
charge of $9.50 per kW demand per month, a
TPNZ connection charge of $0.46 per kW
anytime load and a demand interconnection
charge of $1.75 per kW anytime load demand.
When in full operation the total scheme is
expected to generate a minimum of 8.0 GWh
p.a., previously the landfill site purchased ca.
3.2 GWh of electricity p.a, this electricity is
purchased by the Palmerston North City Council
based on a contract for difference.
The economics of the scheme can be broken
down as shown in Table 5.4.
Based on the above numbers and assuming a
tax rate of 0% (0% is assumed as councils do
not pay tax) and depreciation of 20%, the
project shows an internal rate of return of
77.4% over a lifetime of 20 years. The NPV of
the project is $4.1 million or $3.0 million for a
discount rate of 8 and 12%, respectively.
Based on these figures landfall gas generation
seems a very attractive proposition However,
closer examination of the numbers suggest
that a substantial amount of the costs have
been offset, the only annual costs incurred by
the plant is maintenance, connection, resource
consent cost and well field tuning costs. Costs
associated with personnel on site, fuel costs,
etc., are not charged, one assumes that this is
because these costs were already in place prior
to the development of gas generation and so
have not been included here, i.e. non-avoid-
able costs have not been allocated to the
generation.
Based on the above numbers gas generation
from landfill sites is potentially attractive as a
Table 5.4: Economics of the Palmerston North landfill gas generation scheme
 Revenue Cost Total 
Capital/Investment  $ 620,000 −$ 620,000 
Annual cost  $ 27,400  
Annual income $ 483,500 
(@ 6c/kWh) 
  
Expected Rebate $ 23,700   
Net income   $ 479,800 
    
Pre tax payback   1.3 years 
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fuel source for established generation. However,
it should be noted that the landfill has yet to
meet predicted gas flows and moreover, it could
be argued from an energy utilisation perspective
that greater value could be achieved from direct
use of the gas as a fuel rather than converting
the gas to electricity. A more extensive investi-
gation into the plant operation and costs is
required to obtain a true value of the project.
An important consideration is that gas recovery
from landfills is a useful way to deal with
otherwise environmentally unwanted gases
(obligation to collect and burn landfill methane
is currently being promulgated by government).
There may also be some value in storing gas in
such a way as to be able to optimise genera-
tion against pricing peaks i.e. dispatch genera-
tion in shorter high peak profiles to get higher
avoidance benefits and higher energy prices. It
is not clear how close to real time market
conditions the operator is.
The location of the landfill site is critical in
determining the value of the DG investment.
Powerco has signalled, through its pricing and
connection policy, that there is no particular
benefit to the network company of having
landfill gas generation at the Kairanga substa-
tion but the location of the fuel resource
restricts the the DG investment to that particular
connection point. Despite the minimal value to
the network company the value to the investor
was sufficient for the project to go ahead.
Wanganui Valley hydro scheme
Wanganui Valley Hydro Ltd has installed a 250
kWe hydro induction generator (Laurence Scott,
86% efficiency) with a 300 kWm Turgo turbine
(Gordon Gilkes & Gilbert, England, 85%
efficiency) operating off a small storage dam
with one week of storage (under no inflows
conditions).
The design flow is 200 litres/sec with an
effective head of 158 meters. Both import and
export meters (Time-Of-Use) have been
installed. The project is being finalised.
The generator will be connected to a new
connection approximately 25 km from the
Powerco Kai Iwi Zone Substation (Brunswick
GXP). This is not a constrained Powerco zone
(A-zone) and therefore hasn’t been attributed
any location rebates by Powerco. The nearest
transmission grid node is Rangitautau East Rd.
The site is expected to have a maximum
generation peak of 250 kW. The expected
annual production is 1,500 MWh (a load factor
of ca. 70%). Average generation Coincident
with Maximum Demand is conservatively
estimated to be 125 kW.
Electricity is purchased by Contact Energy at 6
c/kWh, however at some point this is expected
to be established at 7 cents (plus GST).
The economics of the scheme can be broken
down as shown in Table 5.5.
Based on the above numbers and assuming a
tax rate of 30% and depreciation of 20% the
project has an internal rate of return (IRR) of
5.3% (for a lifetime of 20 years). The NPV of
the project is “$101,000 or “$207,000 for a
discount rate of 8 and 12%, respectively.
Clearly the project is unlikely to be economic
on current values.
However, if the Kai Iwi generator were to be
placed in one of Powerco’s ‘constrained zones’
Table 5.5: Economics of the Wanganui Valley hydro scheme
 Revenue Cost Total 
Capital/Investment  $ 608,000 −$ 608,000 
Annual cost  $ 40,600  
Annual income $ 90,000 
(@ 6c/kWh) 
  
Expected Rebate $ 5,900   
Net income   $ 55,300 
    
Pre tax payback   11.0 years 
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the rebates would be more significant, i.e. in
the Whitianga – eastern region – increased
rebates would decrease the payback period to
8.4 years and offer an IRR of 8.5%.  Powerco’s
connection and pricing policy illustrates the
minimal value of this investment in its current
location but the generation resources are tied
to a specific location, limiting the ability of the
investor to chose a connection location.
Once again costs included in this analysis are
specific to the site. Other costs associated with
the project such as personnel appear to be
covered by the Wanganui Valley Hydro Ltd. as
part of there business costs. A fuller economic
analysis is required before a true IRR can be
established for the life of this DG-investment.
Twenty-five km is very remote from the network
and therefore this is not a typical example of
an economic DG application. Remote Area
Power Supplies for domestic supply can
become attractive alternatives to network
connection for distances as close as 2 km. The
length of the network connection is likely to be
the primary constraint on economics. DG would
more typically be used as a solution to avoid
the need for such a connection rather than
create the need.
Conclusions
The above two case studies present an
interesting dilemma. Powerco’s pricing signals
are intended to be supportive of DG invest-
ment in its Eastern Region as this is a region
of high growth and is also increasingly con-
strained because of summer (holiday) demand
profiles. Whilst a location rebate is provided
for the region is it sufficient to attract new
investment?
If the Wanganui Valley hydro scheme was
located in the constrained eastern region the
rebate received ($16,608 per year) returns an
IRR of 8.5% over 20 years. To achieve the
same IRR, but from the Wanganui location
would require a yearly rebate of $23,600.
DG is suited to locations where the network is
located nearby and where connections assets
already exist with sufficient capacity. The
highest value locations to both network owner
and investor as those with network constraints
but the landfill gas generation case study
illustrates that the value to the investor can be
sufficient to progress with installation in
unconstrained locations if the location and
resources allow.
Maximum value is created if plant is operated
at peak output during times of system load
peak. This is not always an energy issue, as
three peaks need to be considered:
1. Network local load peaks when there is a
network constraint.
2. GXP system level profile peaks relative to
transmission constraint signals in the
Transmission Pricing methodology.
3. Energy Market spot price peaks.
Location, contracts, and circumstance will
determine which of these creates the highest
value for the generation owner. For small
projects the complexity and unpredictability of
these peak markets seems to work as a
deterrent to actively manage opportunities.
Existing parties (retailers, lines companies) do
not seem to offer support/products in this area
either. Ideally generation operators need to be
sent a dispatch signal by network operators if
they are to respond effectively.
We note that recently some aggregators have
entered the market and are actively seeking
such opportunities.
Orion Case Study
General Parameters of Case Study
These case studies are line company initiated
DG investments targeting line company issues.
Development of the Orion network to meet
future growth in demand is capital intensive
and is coming under increasingly detailed
scrutiny [42]. Investment in DG is part of
Orion’s response to this increasing demand. DG
development is driven by perceived financial
efficiency and Orion’s assessment of longer-
term investment risks related to network
expansion.
Orion thus describes its investment in DG as a
short-term solution to provide adequate
capacity to meet peak requirements. However,
transmission is also very constrained into
Christchurch. Orion considers transmission
security of supply an issue for it to have a
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management involvement in. It also acts to
minimise transmission cost in the interests of
its consumers rather than adopting a pass-
through stance.
Description of Line Company
Orion is a Canterbury based energy distribution
company. It owns and operates the third
largest electricity networks in the country
serving 180,000 consumers. The company is
owned by the Christchurch City Council (89.3%)
and the Selwyn District Council (10.7%).
The company states that it objective of its AMP
is to “provide, maintain and operate Orion’s
electricity network while meeting agreed levels
of service, quality, safety and performance”.
Orion’s owners have a close involvement in
regional economic development. Orion is the
provider of a key infrastructure servicing a well-
defined regional economy. This is reflected in
the Canterbury Regional Energy Strategy, which
Orion has had a key input role in developing.
Description of Network
Orion’s electricity network is located in central
Canterbury between the Waimakariri to Rakaia
Rivers, stretching from the coast to Arthur’s
Pass. This region encompasses a variety of
terrain including urban areas (Christchurch
city), rural farming regions and isolated high
country. However, the network has a strongly
urban focus.
The specifics of the Orion network can be
summarised shown in Table 5.6.
Orion has 375 major customer connections
(defined as having a maximum electricity
demand greater than 250 kVA) [43]. While this
is only 0.2% of its customers these consumers
consume 25% of total electricity.
Currently Orion is reviewing it Security of
Supply standard to ensure an appropriate
economic balance between investment in
security of supply and all other factors leading
to reliability performance. They expect the new
standard to better reflect the level of security
customers require based on probabilistic
analysis of customer operations. N-1 security
threshold limits are intended to be relaxed from
10 MW to 15 MW, this decrease in substation
reliability is not anticipated to have a signifi-
cant impact on overall network reliability.
Orion appears as an industry leader in terms of
its security standards and delivery. Much
broader economic issues are addressed in its
security management than one would expect
from a purely commercial minimum compliance
orientated approach.
The demands on Orion’s network continue to
grow due to urban growth and the develop-
ment of high energy intensity practises in rural
areas (i.e dairy). Demand is growing at around
1% per annum, Orion projections for peak
demand are for growth at 1.5% per annum over
the next 10 years.
Network Issues
Capacity constraints due to peak demand are
the major driver for network investment in the
Orion region. As explained in the Canterbury
Regional Energy Forum report on energy
security issues in Canterbury [38], most
networks within the Canterbury and South
Canterbury region are seeing annual energy
(GWh) growth rates between 2 and 3% and
peak demand growth rates of between 1% and
Table 5.6: Network Characteristics for Orion (Source: Orion AMP)
Consumer connections 180,500 
Network area 8,000 km2 
Lines and Cables 13,748 km 
Number of GXPs 9 
Zone Substations 50 
Total electricity 3,255 GWH 
Peak demand  592 MW 
Load factor 62.9 % 
Connection density 6 - 30 consumers per km for rural and urban network respectively 
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2%. Orion, via a practice of peak shifting its
load, is able to limit peak demand growth rate
being at the lower end (1.3% averaged over 20
years).
Maximum peak demand is a hard quantity to
predict as it is very dependant on the weather,
which in the Canterbury/South Canterbury
region can be quite volatile. This volatility is
present in both summer, from irrigation (a dry
year results in large irrigation load) and in
winter (from heating).
It should be cautioned that when load is added
gradually over several years of moderate
conditions an extreme event can result in very
high previously unseen peak demand. If the
system is running very close to its limit then
unexpected cold weather can result in capacity
constraints that were not planned for. Many of
the urban GXP’s in Orion’s network are forecast
to run into firm capacity constraints within the
next 5 to 10 years. Islington and Bromley are the
worst affected, with potential problems also
surfacing at Addington, Springston and Hororata.
Some projects are already planned to relieve or
partially relieve some of these constraints.
Furthermore, demand growth in Canterbury and
north in Nelson/Marlborough is putting signifi-
cant strain on the transmission system running
from the southern generators up the island.
Transpower has recently commissioned another
circuit north of Christchurch to Kikiwa but
capacity on the lines running into Christchurch
is already stretched and will continue to
worsen. Transpower is looking at a number of
alternative solutions to this issue. They are
proposing a number of small capacity incre-
ments using improved bussing and transformer
ratings/ capacity in locations such as Islington,
Bromley and Ashburton and series compensa-
tion of the transmission circuits supplying
Canterbury. These projects may culminate in a
new transmission circuit from the southern
generator region into Christchurch in the future.
As a consequence Orion has an active policy of
encouraging measures, such as DG, so as to
relieve peak demand duration. For example,
take Figure 4.6 which in the words of the Orion
AMP [42] “shows that in the year ending March
2006 our load on Transpower exceeded 583MW
for about 8 half hours, even though the
highest net demand was about 591MW. In the
2002 winter, peaking generation of 30MW
would only have needed to operate for about 4
hours to reduce the urban network maximum
demand by about 30MW. In the 2005 winter,
generation of 10MW operating for about 4
hours could have reduced our urban maximum
demand by about 8MW”.
The ability to use DG to meet peak demand
requirements eases the supply requirement
across the distribution network and reduces
the need to import power into the network to
meet these demands.
The importance of ‘peak management’ and
diversity of supply to Orion’s investment
strategy is also reflected in their pricing policy.
Orion’s customer pricing is mainly focused at
peak pricing in order to reduce peak demand
and thereby stimulate efficient use of the
network and reduce the need for (future) new
investments in line capacity. Two main custom-
ers are identified.
General Customer Pricing
Orion does not have any fixed connection
charges, but assigns all its charges to variable
(kWh) and peak charges (kW). The ‘capacity
price’ component is simply a price for the
amount of electricity used and is charged at
differing rates depending on the ‘zone’, month
and time of day. Charges are less at night
generally to encourage retailers, and in turn
households and businesses, to use electricity
at night-time when the network is not so
heavily loaded. Orion reports that during a
peak period, a customer’s electricity use
effectively costs around 85 cents/kWh. This
compares to a cost of around 0.5-4.5 cents/
kWh during non-peak period times.
Major customer pricing
To qualify as a major customer in Orion
territory, a business needs to have a maximum
electricity demand of at least 250kVA. Pricing
for major customer’s has four components:
• a customer-specific charge for the equip-
ment provided by Orion that is dedicated
to delivering their electricity (e.g. transform-
ers),
• a fixed per annum price for their
connection(s),
Page 38 The Economic & System Impacts of Increased DG Connection
• a ‘control period demand’ price of $66.40
(excl GST) per kVA of demand during
control periods, and
• an ‘assessed capacity’ price of $24.40 (excl
GST) per kVA of their assessed capacity.
The control period demand charge and the
assessed capacity charge make up the majority
of the annual distribution costs to major
customers. The control period demand charge
is based on the average demand during peak
control periods and the assessed capacity is
calculated as the average peak demand in the
previous 12 months (irrespective of whether
they occurred during network peaks). This
provides major customers with some cost
certainty and Orion with some revenue cer-
tainty.
DG Profile within the Network
Orion owns and runs one generator perma-
nently located within the network, three
generators providing emergency backup for the
operational control centre at Manchester St and
two mobile generators (specifics listed in Table
5.7). The permanent generator is a 800kVA
diesel generator that is installed at Lyttelton
and utilised for peak load shedding and
providing a ‘lifeline’ electricity supply to the
Lyttelton area in the event of the failure of the
main feeder supplying the area. This generator
can be shifted to another location in the event
of an emergency if required.
The two truck mounted generators are used for
restoring power at a distribution substation
during a fault or some planned works.
Recently Orion gained resource consent to
install a 10 MW diesel generating set on sites
at Bromley and Belfast. (In large permanent
installations gas engines could also be consid-
ered. Ideally these would be located where
there is excess capacity in the gas supply
infrastructure and/or an opportunity to use the
available heat energy arising from combustion).
Proceeding with either of these installations
was subject to satisfactory contractual arrange-
Generator listing (owned by Orion) 
Location Generator ratings  kVA kW 
Simeon substation (Lyttelton) 800 640 
Truck mounted 440 352 
Truck mounted 350 280 
Orion car park 110 88 
Manchester St car park 
(basement) 
55 44 
Armagh district substation 30 24 
Total generating capacity 1,785 1,428 
Table 5:7: Capacities of generators owned by Orion New Zealand Ltd
 Diesel Landfill gas Wind PV & fuel 
cell 
Totals 
 Units 
(kVA) 
Units 
(kVA) 
Units 
(kVA) 
Units 
(kVA) 
Units 
(kVA) 
Load 
substitute 
81 
(15,490) 
1 
(200) 
– 2 
(2.65) 
84 
(15,693) 
Expect  
export 
51 
(14,065) 
– 2 
(500) 
– 53 
(14,565) 
Totals 132 
(29,555) 
1 
(200) 
2 
(500) 
2 
(2.65) 
137 
(30,258) 
Table 5.8: Embedded Generation Connected to Orion’s Network (Source: Orion New Zealand Ltd)
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ments with the Electricity Commission being
negotiated. The Commission has advised,
however, that it does not wish to contract for
any additional capacity and consequently this
project is now on hold.  Orion may instead be
able to develop sufficient installed DG contract
with Transpower or seek to be recognised as
an alternative solution proponent with respect
to the Grid Upgrade Plan process.
Other Distributed Generation Includes (details
in Table 5.8):
• 2 (small) wind farms (Gebbies Pass & E3
Energy).
• Many backup diesel gensets running in
peak-lopping mode with some export
potential.
• Some cogen installations, of which 6 have
a generating capacity of greater than 1 MW.
There are no small-scale hydro power installa-
tions in the Orion network.
The same pricing signals also encourages
consumers to take other demand side actions
such as using the storage of freezers, changing
processing times, etc.
Previous CAE studies have clearly demon-
strated that DG has the potential to reduce the
need to extend network capacity and may be
more economic in certain situations than other
options. However, DG is also important for
Orion as its ‘peak load’ forecast assumes that
an additional 2 MW per annum of peak
distribution generation will be installed.
The economic basis for this is uncertain given
the EC refusal to contract for additional
capacity, but it would appear that Orion is
committed to bringing on-line DG to ensure the
robustness of its network, both in terms of
network capacity and robustness to faults. This
requires that the DG is able to come on-line
when necessary, i.e. its fuel must be able to be
stored or be stable and reliable, this means
that renewables may not be able to meet
Orion’s requirements [42].
If gensets were justified on the basis of being
a security solution as distinct from an energy
trading use the Commerce Commission dispen-
sation for exceeding non-renewable generation
limits should be achievable.
In terms of Orion’s own security requirements
DG can provide an alternative lower cost (and
therefore more affordable higher security)
solution to conventional lines solutions of
building extra interconnections and installing
redundant transformers. A mobile genset
located at a zone sub has more flexibility and
can deliver security further out into the
network. When line solutions are applied to
security they aren’t expected to meet the same
investment criteria.
Orion DG policy
Orion’s DG policy [44] is an extension of its
network pricing policy in that it tries to
stimulate reduction of peak load on networks,
in this case by rewarding generation in peak
periods. As stated in its information  “embed-
ded generation that reliably generates during
peak demand times can provide an economical
alternative to electricity delivery, enhancing
security of supply and service quality”.
Orion contracts export credits with DG genera-
tors who can commit to certain levels of output
during peak or control periods. The credits do
not represent the purchase of electricity, and
exporting customers are able to separately
negotiate to sell exported energy, usually to
their electricity retailer. In 2006 Orion also
introduced a policy of generation credits that
rewards DG-generators (also those that do not
export) for generating in Orion’s control
periods. No commitment to generation levels is
required.
Export credits
This standardised arrangement applies to
connections where the combined output rating
of the generation at the connection does not
exceed 1,000 kVA (Orion considers the terms
and level of credits on an individual basis for
connections with generation capacity in excess
of 1,000 kVA). Export credits were first intro-
duced and have been provided since 1 May
1995. Over time, Orion has developed these
arrangements to better reflect its network
needs. Recently (2006) export credits have
been reduced to reflect their ‘reduced contribu-
tion to security level compared with providing
additional delivery capacity’. There is thus
likely to be an optimal level at which further
additional capacity will be less economically
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efficient than network reinforcement.
A. Requirements
To be eligible for export credits, embedded
generation must meet a number of prior
requirements. In summary, each customer
must:
1. Apply to Orion for approval – where Orion
assesses that the addition of the generator
will beneficially supplement network
capacity, operating characteristics (e.g.
power factor) and/or enhance supply
security (even in the longer term, consider-
ing the possible connection of further
embedded generation). Orion will generally
approve the generation for export credits.
2. Commit to the specified level of generation
– the customer must agree to use reason-
able endeavours to generate and export at
the levels and during the periods indicated
in the application for approval. Orion may
withhold payment if it establishes that this
commitment has not been met. With
reasonable notice, customers may withdraw
from this arrangement at any time, and
may subsequently re-apply for export
credits. Customers who withdraw during a
peak period or control period season and
subsequently re-apply may not be accepted
on Orion’s standard terms.
3. Have appropriate metering – Orion’s export
credits are based on measured export
volumes during specific periods. Customers
wishing to take advantage of Orion’s credits
must ensure that appropriate metering is in
place to record the creditable quantities
required for the calculation of credits.
4. Meet Orion’s requirements – connections
must comply with Orion’s Network code and
connections with embedded generation
must also comply with Orion’s design
standard requirements for embedded
generation [45].
5. Meet statutory and regulatory requirements
– there are a number of statutory and
regulatory requirements relating to electri-
cal safety and reporting of information.
B DG-Categories
For the purpose of applying credits, connec-
tions with embedded generation are catego-
rised based on the combined available output
capacity of the installed generators at the
connection. In most cases this will be the sum
of the generator nameplate kVA ratings, but
this may be de-rated where the power source
is limited. The export credit categories are:
• Small - 0 to 5 kVA
• Medium - 5 to 30 kVA
• Large - 30 to 1,000 kVA
C Creditable periods
The credit basis for each export category varies
in terms of incidence, duration and payment
level. For small and medium size generators,
the credit is based on export that occurs
during Orion’s peak period. In essence peak
periods occur when Orion is shedding residen-
tial hot-water heating load in order to limit the
maximum load on the network - during winter
in the mainly urban zone A, and during
summer in rural zone B9.
For large generators, the credit is based on the
average export that occurs during Orion’s
control period. These periods are basically
defined as the periods when Orion activates its
‘ripple control’ signals to manage peak
demand. The total annual length of the control
period varies from 20 to 120 hours.
Generation credits
In 2006 Orion also introduced credits to
customers that generate electricity when
signalled by Orion (without necessarily export-
ing). This arrangement provides the opportu-
nity for Orion to enhance security of supply
during constraints and reduce the duration of
residential hot-water shedding during times of
peak loading. Generation credits are separate
from, and available in addition to, the export
credits (as detailed above). Unlike the export
credits, this credit is based on the amount of
electricity generated, rather than the amount
exported, recognising that generation lowers
the load on Orion’s network (regardless of
whether the electricity is used within the
connection or by other connections).
Subject to the requirements below, Orion’s
9 Note that under the proposed new Transpower pricing
regime, peak demand would not be charged per GXP
anymore, but averaged per region. This would mean that
the summer peaks in the rural zoned (mainly irrigation)
will most likely be averaged out by the urban peaks.
Orion will most likely change its connection pricing rebate
policies accordingly.
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generation credits are available in respect of all
connections where the combined output rating
of the generation is between 30 kVA and 1,000
kVA. Orion will consider making the credit
available to connections with more generation
than this on a case-by-case basis, considering
the location within the network and the
magnitude of the load change. In these cases
Orion may offer a lower price or specify a
maximum generation setting. It is not economic
for Orion to process payments for generation
of less than 30 kVA.
A. Requirements
Requirements are generally the same as those
described above, Orion must approve the
generation as being eligible for generation
credits. Orion’s aim is to lower the load on the
overall network and Orion will approve genera-
tion that assists with this aim. Unlike export
credits, customers are not required to commit
to any set level of generation. With the aim of
lowering loading levels on the overall network,
the diversity in generation response is spread
over a larger number of contributors (this
generation is not intended for localised
security of supply or to reduce capital expendi-
ture on network capacity). Customers may elect
not to run for various reasons such as high
diesel prices, maintenance constraints, exceed-
ing the running hours allowed in the terms of
their operating consent, or because they
cannot run at certain times of day or days of
the week. Orion will not generally approve this
credit for passive generation, such as wind
turbines or solar PV, which are not able to
switch on when required.
B Creditable periods
Credits are provided for generation only during
Orion’s ripple signalled generation period.
Generation periods are instigated manually by
Orion, when it is beneficial to lower the overall
load on the network, subject to the following:
• Generation periods only relate to load
management (in response to peaks or
constraint situations, or to test the re-
sponse of the arrangement). Generally, to
comply with resource consents, generation
periods are not initiated for other reasons
(such as in response to energy shortages).
• Each generation period runs for a minimum
of 30 minutes, but is not limited to any
maximum duration. In extended generation
periods, customers may elect to cease
generation prior to the end of the genera-
tion period.
• There is no minimum or maximum total
duration of accumulated generation period
each year, although Orion expects to test
the arrangement each year providing at
least 30 minutes of generation period.
• Generation periods can occur at any time of
day, any day of the year, with no warning.
Orion aims to minimise any period of overlap
between generation periods and major cus-
tomer control periods. On occasions when
overlap does occur, the customer may simulta-
neously benefit from the generation credit, a
reduced contribution to control period demand,
and possibly the export credit.
Connection and rebate policies are reviewed
annually. Orion reserves the right to alter the
policies and does not make long-term commit-
ments in respect of its DG-policies.
Very large generation
The standard export and generation credits do
not normally apply for connections with
combined generation capacity in excess of
1,000 kVA. The benefits of embedded genera-
tion in relation to electricity delivery are not as
clear when a large contribution is applied at a
single point in the network, even if this is only
offsetting a customer’s existing load.
Orion’s restrictions on the standard basis for
export and generation credits are intended to
allow Orion to maximise the benefit from this
group of customers.
Orion individually assesses the benefits
provided by each opportunity, and provides
customised credits that reflect these benefits.
In some cases the standard credits may be
offered, but in other cases a reduced credit or
additional terms and conditions are offered.
Orion may also limit the term of the credits to
an appropriate number of years to reflect the
benefit derived from embedded generation.
When assessing the benefits provided by very
large generation, Orion considers:
• planned capital expenditure which might be
deferred
• the actual expected reduction in transmis-
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sion expenses
• the level of supply security provided by the
generation
• the interaction with other generation in the
area, and
• the availability of generation during
capacity shortages (other than at peak
times, for example, during planned mainte-
nance).
Case Studies
Chateau-on-the-Park – Diesel
The ‘Chateau on the Park’ hotel in Christchurch
is a ‘major customer’ on Orion’s Network;
therefore its distribution costs are set by peak
demand. In 2001 it decided to install a 375
KVA (300 kWe) diesel stand-by set to secure its
electricity supply and lower its peak demand
(maximum demand was around 500 kWe
before installation) and thereby distribution
costs. Since 2006 it has also participated in
Orion’s generation credits scheme, when
possible generating on Orion’s signal in control
periods. For this purpose the generator is
equipped with a separate meter at the genera-
tor. The hotel does not export electricity.
The project was commissioned in 2002. Total
investment was around NZ$150,000, which paid
itself back in ca. 3 years according to Orion.
The generator is owned by Abacus Pty Ltd and
operated by ‘Chateau on the Park’; it is
connected to the network at the main MEN
switchboard. As it is connected behind the
hotel’s existing connection point it does not
attract any separate connection charges. Its
main influence is lowering the monthly (aver-
age Control Period Demand) and assessed
(annual average peak) demand for transmis-
sion and distribution charges.
The Control Period Demand is calculated as the
average demand in Orion’s Control Periods (20
– 120 hours per year). The assessed demand
peak is calculated according to the Transpower
methodology, i.e. the average of the 12 highest
demand peaks in the last 12 months.
On the bases of the information supplied the
economics of the scheme can be broken down
as shown in Table 5.9.
Based on the above numbers and assuming a
tax rate of 30% and depreciation of 20% the
project has an internal rate of return (IRR) of
10.9% (for a lifetime of 20 years). The NPV of
the project is $30,000 or “$10,000 for a
discount rate of 8 and 12%, respectively.
However these numbers may not tell the full
story as Orion report on their website that “the
Chateau on the Park (a local hotel) has
invested over $150,000 in an energy manage-
ment system and a diesel generator. As a result
of our pricing, its investment in this technology
was paid back in around three years through
savings in ongoing electricity purchase costs”.
It is hard to pinpoint what is the reason behind
the variation between our and Orion’s payback
estimates. The reason may be that the account-
ing benefits applied in our analysis only
considered tangible benefits, consideration was
not given to other economic cost benefits
driving the owner’s value decision (such as the
loss of business if the supply is interrupted).
This generator was not installed to produce
energy economically for sale, the generator is
an investment in risk management and in an
ideal world it would never be needed. Our
analysis is not assigning any value to risk
management; in its analysis Orion may well
have assigned such a value. A minimum value
for risk management would be the savings
associated with the next cheapest option to
Table 5.9: Economics of the Chateau-on-the-Park diesel
 Revenue Cost Total 
Capital/Investment   $ 154,000 −$ 154,000 
Annual cost   $ 12,600  
Load reduction  $ 34,700   
Net income    $ 22,100 
    
Pre tax payback   7.0 years 
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achieve the same security level. This is a point
that should be noted for all cases in this
report; the analysis in this report is treating DG
as if it is a generation only proposal. In some
cases, such as this one, the benefits calculated
are only a bonus; they are not the primary
reason behind the installation of DG.
Southbridge wind generator
Energy3 owns and operates a single 100 kW
wind turbine at Southbridge in the Orion
network. The turbine is a second hand Tellus
T1995. Average wind speed at the site is 6.5 m/
s and the expected annual load factor is ca.
25% with an expected generation capacity of
210,000 kWh p.a. The project was connected
and commissioned in 2003 at a new connec-
tion, but close to an existing 11kV feeder.
RMA-issues were of little concern in this
project. The council approved a non-notified
consent and the whole process took 3 to 4
weeks. Total consenting costs were in the order
of NZ$6,000 for landscape consultants, council
fees and documentation and legal work
Cost for the new connection (but at short
distance from an existing 11 kV feeder) was ca.
NZ$17,000, the nearest transmission grid node
is at Hororata.
Annual connection costs total around NZ$500
p.a. Export credits are likely to be low (average
25 kW export) as wind generation can’t be
controlled to generate in peak periods. This is
estimated at NZ$1,500 p.a.
Meridian purchases the electricity generated by
the turbine at a price of approximately 7 c/
kWh.
The economics of the scheme can be broken
down asshown in Table 5.10.
Based on the above numbers and assuming a
tax rate of 30% and depreciation of 20% the
project shows an internal rate of return of
5.2% over a lifetime of 20 years. The NPV of
the project is “$24,000 or “$48,000 for a
discount rate of 8 and 12%, respectively.
It is interesting to note that the turbine was
purchased second hand from Europe. According
to the Energy3  website [46], the turbine has a
lifespan of 25 years of which 15+ years are still
available. The company believes that using
second hand wind turbines (5-10 years of age)
from Europe will provide a cost-benefit,
improving the commercial attractiveness of
developing small wind farms (5 turbines
operational plus 1 spare) to produce 2-4 MW of
electricity. The extra age of the turbines will
mean that additional maintenance will prob-
ably be required; Energy3 has budgeted for 1
turbine to be reconditioned every third year
(based on a 5 turbine site).
The Southbridge turbine has an average yearly
maintenance allowance of NZ$2,000 a year.
Despite this low maintenance cost the econom-
ics are marginal at best. While this project was
a pilot study of 1 turbine to determine the
practical feasibility of distributed wind genera-
tion, the optimal size of the project, according
to Energy3 [46], would be to have 5 turbines
operating with wind speeds of 7-8m/sec, The
economics of such a  project would improve,
but whether it would be commercially viable is
uncertain.
Also of note is that this site has a very low
quality wind resource (6.5m/s, 25% availabil-
ity). The same installation in a better location
would achieve a positive NPV (7.5m/s, 30%
availability). It is also likely that slight larger
and taller turbines (500-1000 kW) would
achieve better viability.
Table 5.10: Economics of Southbridge wind generator
 Revenue Cost Total 
Capital/Investment  $ 140,000 -$ 140,000 
Annual cost  $ 4,000  
Annual income $ 14,700@ 7c/kWh   
Expected Rebate $ 1,500   
Net income   $ 12,600 
Pre tax payback   11.1 years 
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A key conclusion from this installation is that
smaller second-hand plants have a reduced
investment requirement and lower risks.
Therefore there will be savings associated with
the project, for example a lower level of wind
monitoring will be required, and lower quality
wind resources could be utilised. This increases
the likelihood of locating the site very close to
the network and the network having sufficient
connection capacity, thereby minimising costs.
CCC landfill gas cogeneration engine at QEII
sports complex
The Christchurch City Council (CCC) recently
closed the Burwood landfill and is now
converting it into a green space. To deal with a
concerns of local residents with regards to
smells that may be associated with landfill gas
(LFG) a system of wells and associated pipe
work was installed and the collected gas
flared. This system became operational in May
2004. A subsequent study was performed to
gauge the economic viability of installing
additional wells (to increase gas volumes),
processing the gas and transporting it 4 km by
underground piping into QEII for use in the
sport complex’s boilers. As part of the concept
study the inclusion of a base load
cogeneration system was raised, and following
assessment was included in the project.
The cogeneration engine is used to provide
both electricity and heat. It produces enough
electricity to meet the base load requirement
of the complex, which results in an annual
saving of $215,000. As all the electricity
produced by the plant is used within the
complex, electricity is not sold back to the
network. Heat produced by the cogeneration
engine is used to heat the QEII swimming pool.
The engine produces electricity at 30% effi-
ciency; however by utilising the excess heat
produced a total efficiency of 60% is achieved.
The total project (methane capturing wells,
associated pipelines and the co-generation
plant) cost $4.2 million to install and is
reported to have a 4 year payback period [47].
The project was viable as the CCC obtained
Kyoto Protocol ‘Carbon Credits’ for the destruc-
tion of the methane content of the LFG. A
tender for Carbon Credits was submitted to the
Ministry for the Environment in Oct 2004,
which was successful as part of the govern-
ment’s “Project to Reduce Emissions Pro-
gramme’. The government awarded the council
200,000 carbon credits for the capture and
transport of methane gas from the landfill. In
September 2006, CCC sold its carbon credits to
a single, overseas, private sector buyer for $3
million over five years (2008-2012)35. Further
savings were achieved by using the landfill gas
to heat the complex swimming pool. Tradition-
ally, heating has been achieved using liquefied
petroleum gas (LPG); in 2004 the complex
used around 1.5 million litres of LPG at a cost
of $550,000 [48].
The economics specific to the co-generation
engine is shown in Table 5.11.
Based on the above numbers and assuming a
tax rate of 0% (0% is assumed as councils do
not pay tax) and depreciation of 20% the
project results in an internal rate of return (IRR)
of 18.1% (based over 20 years). The NPV of the
project is $467,000 or $156,000 for a discount
rate of 8 and 12%, respectively.
The cogeneration plant, on its own, appears
worthwhile. When consideration is given to
savings made through the reduction of LPG use
and the revenue gained from the sale of
carbon credits the operation as a whole looks
very attractive. As stated early, the council
Table 5.11: Economics of CCC gas cogeneration engine
 Revenue Cost Total 
Capital/Investment   $ 930,000 −$ 930,000 
Annual cost   $ 40,000  
Annual income  $ 215,000   
Net income   $ 175,000 
    
Pre tax payback Excl. LPG savings & 
carbon credits 
 5.3 years 
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reported that the project, has a whole, had a
payback of 4 years.
Conclusions
The strategic direction adopted by Orion to
encourage DG connections within its network
has encouraged DG penetration. However, its
stated aim to bring on-line 2MW of DG per
year to ease peak demands on its network
(and to reduce the need to upgrade network
capacity) suggests that its price scheme may
need future adjustment to encourage a greater
uptake.
The connection and pricing policy developed
by Orion has affected the locations and types
of technology used in DG investments. The
policies reward controllable or firm generation
that Orion can use for peak load reduction.
This has influenced the choice of technology
used for DG with investors turning to gas or
diesel generation rather than intermittent wind
or solar/PV so as to maximise their income
from generation and/or export credits. The
interaction between Orion’s pricing policy and
investment technology choice is a good
example of well designed policy maximising
value to both investor and network company.
The economics for DG presented here are more
positive than the case studies from the Powerco
network. Whilst the numbers behind the wind
farm were poor, the other two case studies
report good returns, with both operators
reporting a payback period of less than 5 years.
The wind farm offers little benefits to Orion as
it is a robust network looking to reduce peak
demands rather than making the network more
secure. As wind production cannot be pre-
determined its generation does not assist
Orion’s network priorities. This issue could
potentially be overcome by selecting slightly
better resource sites, having some diversity
and using other generation such as diesel
gensets already installed to firm the wind
generation.
There is also another obvious wind application
that is often overlooked. That is using wind
directly to pump and store water instead of
electricity. Wind pumping and generation has
many synergies with irrigation.
The Chateau on the Park generator is an
example of a system that can be timed to meet
the needs of the network and so is used by
the hotel to reduce its load. The hotel reports
that the generator paid itself off after 3 years
of operation, but this is not supported by the
study team analysis. The discrepancy most
likely lies in that the accounting benefits
applied to the study analysis only considered
tangible benefits, and excluded other indirect
benefits arising from loss prevention.
Gas cogeneration at QEII returned positive
values with an internal rate of return around
10%. The system reduces the base load from
the QEII complex. The use of landfill gas as an
alternative fuel source to LPG and the revenue
that can be gained from carbon credits results
in CCC gas utilisation project, of which the
cogeneration plant is a part of, having a
payback period of 4 years.
The numbers for this project suggests that
savings obtained by reducing QEII’s electricity
use was a nice project perk; the driving force
behind the work was the council’s desire to
reduce its LPG costs and to take advantage of
potential carbon savings. Having a host heat
load was also important.
Network Tasman Case Study
General Parameters of Case Study
This case study is an example of consumer DG
investment encouraged by the lines company
to solve line issues. Network Tasman sees DG
as a way of reducing network losses, and the
potential for reduced GXP demand based
charges through cooperative action [49].
Description of Line Company
Network Tasman distributes electricity across
the wider Nelson and Tasman areas and is
owned by the Network Tasman Trust on behalf
of its customers. The distribution network is
relatively small compared to Powerco and
Orion, with only 33,000 (approx.) consumer
connections but typical in size and profile for
most NZ regional line companies.
The company’s mission statement is “to own
and operate efficient, reliable and safe electric-
ity networks and other complimentary busi-
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nesses while increasing consumer value” [49].
Description of Network
Network Tasman distribution network is based
in the north west of the South Island (Figure 4-
7) encompassing the wider Nelson region and
the Tasman area. It runs from the coast in-land
skirting the major ranges in the area. The
company supplies a mixture of high connection
density urban areas and low connection
density rural areas. Its does not own the
distribution network serving Nelson city
The specifics of the network can be summa-
rised as shown in Table 5.12.
Network security is superior within the urban
industrial and commercial areas where load
density and interconnection is higher. The
urban areas have a high level or reliability
relative to the rural networks. This is consistent
with Network Tasman’s security policy.
In the foreseeable future (10 years) Network
Tasman predicts a steady state increase in both
its energy consumption and peak demand with
grow at a rate of 18 GWh and 3 MW per
annum, respectively. This means that percent-
age growth is projected to decline over these
years. The Tasman region has one of the
highest population growth rates in New
Zealand and as a result Network Tasman is
currently observing demand for new connec-
tions, followed by demands for greater capac-
ity. High growth means that the Network
Tasman can only plan with a degree of confi-
dence for up to five years. DG security and
capacity options that facilitate incremental and
sustainable upgrade paths are therefore
desirable.
Network Issues
The nature of development in the region
means that Network Tasman cannot predict
with any degree of accuracy long-term trends
across its distribution network. Consumer
demographics are changing significantly.
Currently Network Tasman expects that:
• Continued residential growth over the next
ten years, especially in costal zones and
areas nearer forestry regions.
• A move away from combustion heating to
electricity heating as the Tasman region
attempts to improve air quality in winter.
• Industrial growth around Tahuna and
Richmond, mainly light manufacturing,
seafood processing and packaging, fruit
packaging, cold storage and timber
processing.
• Conversion of farmland and rural blocks
into lifestyle blocks around Nelson and in
Moutere and the Waimea Plains and Golden
Bay
• Dairy development in the Maruia Valley and
Tapawerea area. Both areas are remote
from an electricity supply view point.
Currently no sections of the network has
experienced lost of load rendering network
assets stranded, however some regions of the
network are uneconomic. Further development
in remote areas will put further strain on the
network. Development of DG will be of assist-
ance during this period of growth, potentially
reducing demand, and hence Transpower
charges; DG development would be more
advantageous in remote regions where it can
increase supply security by providing an
electricity source should parts of the network
become isolated due to network failure
Table 5.12: Network Tasman distribution network details
Consumer connections 34,400 
Network area 10,800 km2 
Lines and Cables 3,265 km 
Number of GXPs 5 
Zone Substations 10 
Total electricity 701 GWh 
Peak demand  133 MW 
Load factor 64.5 % 
Connection density – 
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elsewhere.
DG Profile within the Network
Tasman Network’s DG policy is as given in its
AMP as follows.
Network Tasman has an open access policy and
welcomes the connection of all forms of
distributed generation on its network. The
benefits of reduced network losses, and the
potential for reduced GXP demand based
charges through cooperative operation are well
recognised. There are three examples of
distributed generation operating within the NTL
network at present. Prior to the connection of
new distributed generation, it is necessary for
studies of the operating conditions of the new
generator at the point of connection with the
distribution network to be completed. These
studies identify issues that may affect existing
network assets or other users of the network.
Examples include asset overload or introduced
effects such as voltage rise or voltage distur-
bance creating interference with other con-
nected consumers supplies.
Operation of the generating plant under
network fault conditions and provision of
means to isolate the generation during times
of network maintenance are also required to be
understood and managed. Deployment of NTL
operated local generation is considered as an
alternative to incremental distribution asset
investment as a part of the network develop-
ment planning process. This is an option
particularly applicable when seasonal peak
loads occur such as in holiday areas or
seasonal/temporary loads such as crop harvest-
ing.
Additional communication with the company10
determined that the cost of extending the
network to cope with any installed DG is
passed on to the developer. The exception
being when the DG offsets already intended
network development; an example would be
when the DG removes the need for expected
network development due to load growth. The
costs incurred by a developer may be rebated
if other DG applications take advantage of
network development (in these cases the
rebate would be charged to the new devel-
oper).
Typically small DG installations (0-10kW) can be
accommodated on the network with minimal
fuss, however bigger installations (50-200kW)
will require an investigation to determine the
network investment that would be required to
meet DG generation capacity.
Network Tasman, like all networks is not
permitted to purchase electricity from DG
owners. It passes on to the DG operator the
avoided cost of transmission. There are no
long-term contracts for avoided transmission
cost. Nor has DG been used as an alternative
to transmission upgrade, which is surprising
given the growth and transmission issues in
the region.
There are three examples of DG operations
within the Network Tasman network at present.
They are privately owned hydro schemes
located within the Golden Bay and Motueka
GXP regions (Brooklyn, 250 kW; Onekaka, 900
kW; Pupu Valley, 250 kW). Network Tasman
also owns and operates one relocatable 1 MW
diesel generator.46
Case Study
Onekaka mini hydro scheme
The Onekaka hydro scheme is owned by
Onekaka Energy and operated by Bryan
Leyland. It is based on an abandoned scheme
that supplied the old ironworks in Golden Bay,
at the top of the South Island. The project uses
the original dam and second-hand equipment
to reduce costs. The 2 unit 940 kW hydroelec-
tric scheme was built and commissioned in
October 2003 (it was realised in hindsight that
a new 800 kW vertical Pelton wheel turbine
and supporting penstocks above ground would
have been cheaper than the reconditioned old
plant). The scheme is connected to the
network at Motupipi, which is also the location
of the closest GXP.
The station is unattended and is monitored
and controlled by cell phone text messaging.
Design flow is 630 litres/sec with an effective
head of 210 metres. The efficiency of the new
runner in one of the turbines is 89.2%, the
original efficiency was probably about 80%.
The installation has half-hourly (ToU) metering
10 Personal communication with Murray Hendrickson,
Network Tasman
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of active and reactive power generation.
At the dam there was 120 W solar cell to
supply the radio and PLC but this could not
supply the control circuits with a standing load
of 6 W. Overall it has been a reliable system,
but has required some fine-tuning.
The initial 11 kV grid connection used was not
adequate, mainly due to voltage swings caused
on the local 11 kV network. The installation HV
connection therefore had to be up rated to use
a 33 kV feeder (with assumed extra costs). The
initial maximum output of 400 kW at 11 kV was
able to be increased up to the rated 940 kW at
33 kV.
The Resource Management Act and other
regulatory requirements caused problems and
delays. Overall, these probably added
$300,000 to the cost of the scheme. It is not
obvious that there was any environmental
benefit from this.  Much of the cost was for
consultant’s reports and legal fees. The
consultant’s reports showed that, as would be
expected, floods were the major environmental
effect on the river upstream and downstream
of the scheme.
The average annual energy output is 3.6 GWh
which is sold in to the electricity market at
spot price. Charges by the network are $15 per
day for administration and transformer supply;
in return Network Tasman offers a rebate of $11
per day for avoidance of transmission intercon-
nection charges. In addition there is a charge
of 3% of gross income as water rent to DOC.
The economics of the scheme can be broken
down as shown in Table 5.13.
Based on the above numbers and assuming a
tax rate of 30% and a depreciation of 20% an
internal rate of return rate of 2.3% is obtained
(for a lifetime of 20 years). The NPV of the
project is “$724,000 or “$1,020,000 for a
discount rate of 8 and 12%, respectively.
It is clear from the above breakdown that this
scheme is not economically viable and that with
a payback period of 15 years it is at best a
marginal investment and at worst a poor one.
Conclusion
This case study shows that the economics of
small scale hydro schemes is limited by
location. Leyland, the operator of this scheme,
concludes in his paper [50] that such projects
are unlikely to be economic due to the regula-
tory and legal environment in New Zealand. He
goes on to conclude that the small scale hydro
development in New Zealand is unlikely
without government subsidies or further
reforms to the electricity market and consent
processes. While the location of DG in this case
study has value to the network company
through deferring investment and potentially
improving line voltage, the benefits returned to
the investor are not sufficient to compensate
for the costs of the investment resulting in the
project having very little value to the investor.
Consistent transmission, line and generation
connection pricing methodologies across the
industry would help.
Network Tasman has an open policy to DG, as
it sees the need for it to shore up its network,
but is concerned over the capital investments
that are required to ensure the network can
cope with the incoming DG. Due to its short-
term outlook, which is caused by uncertainty in
the growth patterns in the region, the ability to
ride out developments without spending
Table 5.13: Economics of the Onekaka mini hydro scheme
 Revenue Cost Total 
Capital/Investment  $ 2,200,000 −$ 2,200,000 
Annual cost  $ 72,000  
Annual income $ 216,000 
(@ ≈ 7 c/kWh) 
  
Rebates $ 4,000   
Net income   $ 148,000 
Pre tax payback   14.9 years 
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capital would be advantageous until a stronger
idea of the needs of the region can be deter-
mined.
Case Study Discussion
General overview
For connection purposes (network management
perspective) four distinct DG-categories can be
distinguished:
A. Residential generation, often solar PV-
installations. These installations generally
export little. Each installation per se has
little influence on the network, but high
density solar installations (future in urban
areas) might create a combined impact on
local feeders.
B. (Co)-Generation that exports at times, e.g.
cogen and landfill gas generators con-
nected to an existing electric connection
(industrial or landfill site)
C. Generation only (or generation-mainly) DG
like small hydro and wind sites in new
connections. These are generally in more
remote, rural locations with significant
investments in project specific equipment
(e.g. transformers, line to closest grid
point, breakers, etc.) and relatively low
connection density.
D. Peak-lopping equipment, often diesel
gensets that have as a primary purpose
providing backup services, but are also
economically used to reduce the owner’s
peak demand charges and (sometimes)
generate at lines company’s signal to assist
in system peaks.
These cases are summarised in Table 5.14. It is
the export-only-category that most often
impacts on lines’ company costs, and is where
DG-policy differences between lines companies
seem to show the most influence.
Outline of DG-policies
In general all distribution lines companies
appear to have a similar policy structure for DG,
including:
• A published DG-connection process
• Cost pricing of project specific equipment
• Lines connection charges
• Transmission charges (connection &
interconnection)
• Rebates on lines charges and transmission
charges for generation at peak times.
This seems a significant step forward to that
previously and is in line with current govern-
ment policy objectives.
However, government policy objectives with
regard to pricing principles for DG have not
been explicitely formulated and developed into
a consistent industry approach to pricing
methodology.
In principle all lines companies will charge
project-specific equipment and related costs to
the DG-developer. The DG-developer may
choose to have equipment (esp. transformers)
owned and maintained by the line company,
but in many cases it is not specified how costs
can be recuperated if other users make use of
the same equipment in the future. This would
seem a matter for further regulation and the
issue is well recognised.
Treatment of annual lines connection charges
seems to be the point of most difference.
Powerco has a standard policy (for installations
under 1 MW) that charges the same line use
rates for Distributed Generators as for load,
under the premise that they largely use the
same common network (common costs). We
note that Vector seems to adhere to the same
principle, although this has not been specifi-
cally checked.
Orion indicates it will review connection
charges on a case-by-case basis, reviewing the
capacity on the local network. When sufficient
capacity is available connection charges can be
very small (a type of marginal cost pricing
seems to be used; i.e. where no adaptations to
the wider network need to be made for the
DG-project, connection charges are small),
although the number of cases implemented
under this policy seem to be very limited.
Network Tasman seems to adhere to similar
principles, as their annual lines charges for the
project reviewed are at a similar level.
Transmission (connection & interconnection)
charges are charged in similar manners with
slight variations in peak measurement methods,
depending on the lines company characteristics.
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All lines companies studied  have a system for
rebates where the DG-project supports the local
network as well. For the Powerco-territory the
rebates clearly depend on the zone (substation),
whether any value is attributed to lowering
system peaks. For the Orion territory generally
urban peaks are in winter, and DG-installations
that can generate in these peaks are attributed
export (and/or generation) credits. Rural GXPs
generally have their peaks in summer (irrigation
related) and DG-installations in these areas are
attributed export credits for generating in those
peaks. Orion uses relay signals for announcing
peaks. This contributes to predictability for DG-
installations.
Implications of different DG-policies
The differences between the DG-policies
reviewed become particularly significant for
generation-only projects (especially small-scale
hydro and wind)10. For peak-lopping and co-
gen installations, the DG-installations generally
either lower the total peak (and therefore lines
charges) or the generation peak is not signifi-
cantly different from the (former) load peak
(and lines charges remain similar under all
policies).
In the example of the diesel genset at Chateau
on the Park it can be seen that the background
and general pricing policies of Powerco and
Orion networks are quite different. The Orion
network operates quite closely to the security
constraints of the transmission system and can
be very constrained in (winter) peaks. Orion
has consciously chosen to put more emphasis
on peak charging (without a diesel genset the
total lines charges for the hotel would seem to
be almost 40% lower in the Powerco network
than in the Orion-network). This gives consider-
able incentive to reduce peak demand.
Similarly Orion provides significant incentives
to on-peak generation.
Powerco on the other hand has a network with
significant spare capacity (except for specific
areas like Coromandel). Their approach is more
aimed at achieving revenues to pay for the
capital costs of the network reinforcement in
critical areas and thereby provides less
incentive for peak reductions. In many areas
they also provide rebates for generation
coinciding with distribution and transmission
system peaks, but since the system peaks are
not very predictable (for the Distributed
Generator), the risk of generating at high
capacity outside the peak (and therefore being
10 Every generation project normally has some load for
equipment, lighting, maintenance and start-up, when the
generator itself is not generating. The peak load generally
is significantly lower than the peak generation, though.
Table 5.14: DG categories for connection purposes
 < 10 kW < 1 MW 1 – 5 MW > 5 MW 
Non-export 
Export-import 
Residential PV, 
SWH: Standard 
approach 
necessary, 
regulated?* 
Negotiations with retailer and lines company of much 
lesser impact 
Export  only N/A Most problematic  
little benefit/ incentive 
to lines company; 
high impact on 
viability. Too large for 
standard approach, 
too little for case-by-
case 
Count number of 
renewable hydro-
wind projects in this 
category 
Potential 
problems (level 
playing field), 
but case-by-
case approach 
warranted + 
negotiations 
possible 
Case-by-case 
approach 
warranted + 
negotiations 
possible 
Back-up and 
Peak lopping 
N/A Network and/or consumer  
orientated benefits 
 
*
 A “plug and play” approach appears to have the greatest potential in the domestic DG market, where product standardisation 
and mass production can deliver economic solutions. This can happen without significant change to LV distribution networks 
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liable for a high connection charge) often
outways the potential higher rebates. Invest-
ment would be covered if clear, predictable
signals could be provided to align production
to the system’s peaks.
The DG literature shows that connection and
pricing policy can be used to signal desirable
locations and types of investment which in
turn affects the actions of investors. Orion’s
policies reward system co-incident peak
demand reduction whereas Powerco is
focussed towards network reinforcement.
Case Study Evaluation
RMA-Consenting process and costs
Signals from several small-scale hydro-projects
(including the 2 case studies included) are that
the RMA-process for getting consent for
installing the hydro-installation and using the
water is lengthy, complex and costly given the
scale of the projects. Apart from the up-front
costs for acquiring the consents, several
councils now pose annual charges for using the
water (justified on the basis of monitoring and
compliance costs) which can take up to 7% of
gross annual revenue. This is a significant
deterrent.
Consenting costs may very well make an
otherwise viable project uneconomic. This is an
issue for Regional Energy Strategies to identify
opportunity and determine which ones are to
be encouraged via appropriate provisions in
Regional and District Plans.
Retail contracts
Generators are offered a variety of contracts by
retialers that can reflect both local and system
cost factors relative to their generation portfolio
and customer base mix. Small independant
generators with the hedging benefits of a retail
customer base lack market power to realise full
value recognition in energy purchase contracts.
The emergence of aggregators in the market
confirms that there is an  additional margin to
be realised.
Small generators are in a stronger position if
they have storage, backup, and other diversi-
fied generation capacity.
Transmission Opportunities
DG has a sizeable opportunity with respect to
avoiding transmission upgrades. However the
current Grid Investment Test process that
applies presents a bias towards transmission
solutions to the detriment to DG solutions. We
comment that that once a transmission
solution has been approved there is no risk of
the investment becoming stranded because of
privileged pricing methodology.  In the Orion
circumstance, for example, a 10MW DG invest-
ment was not able to proceed through not
being able to arrive at satisfactory contractual
arrangements with the Electricity Commission.
Instead, it should be possible to offer DG
operators long-term contracts for transmission
support that allow consistent risk treatments to
be applied.
Economics
The cases studied – although few – confirm
that it isn’t easy to make an economic case for
investment in DG in the present circumstances.
Positive exceptions appear to be landfill gas
and cogen projects, as well as peak-lopping,
especially if this generation is also necessary
for reasons of security backup. Small projects
based on hydro and wind resources seem
particularly difficult when any distance from
existing supporting infrastructure.
Particular difficulties encountered by new
projects are: RMA-issues, acess to affordable
and experienced engineering, securing ad-
equate retail contracts and negotiating line
company connection contracts.
In general it can be concluded that Distributed
Generation is an area that is new to many line
companies and at present still a minor part of
their operations. Treatment of connection
charges can be significantly different between
line companies, but a lot of learning-in-
progress is taking place. This particularly
impacts the generation-only and especially
renewables (hydro and wind) DG-projects.
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6  PROJECT FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS
The analysis contained in this report was
conducted with the intention of examining the
feasibility of commercial DG in the current
regulatory environment and to establish criteria
to ensure successful DG investment. The
desired high level overview of DG investment
criteria and opportunities has not eventuated
due to the recurring theme of the importance
of location and other site-specific factors in
evaluating DG investment opportunities.
The location of DG investment within a
network is the most important factor in
assessing the value of an investment to both
the network company and investor. Every
investment opportunity has unique effects on
system performance, power flows, power
quality, peak load reduction, protection
systems and constraint management. To
investigate the feasibility of DG investment
each specific investment opportunity must be
analysed individually to assess network impact,
ability to defer investment and revenue/cost
streams.
This type of study requires specialist knowl-
edge of network characteristics at the pro-
posed connection point, power flow studies,
detailed costing of generation and connection
technology, proposed generation levels and
impacts of the investment on network opera-
tion. The individualised nature of DG means
that developing generalised investment criteria
is not appropriate to assess value and feasibil-
ity of investments.for example, in this study,
the primary economic value creator ranged
from transmission, distribution, energy market
and consumer service applications.
The importance of location of DG investment
and the unique characteristics of each invest-
ment is reflected in the connection and pricing
policies of network companies. Policy develop-
ment and implementation is used to encourage
DG investment in locations where the greatest
value to the network can be realised and to
better achieve strategic objectives such as
improving system security and power quality.
The importance of location to the value of DG
is illustrated by the case studies presented.
Where the network realises very little value
from the investment such as the Wanganui
Valley hydro scheme and the Southbridge wind
turbine, the value to the investor is also
reduced as rebates from the network company
are minimal. For investments that can be
optimally located near to both network
connections and fuel resources such as both
landfill gas generation case studies the value
to the investor is improved due to the onsite
location of generation resources. The case
studies presented illustrate that even within
the same distribution network, DG investment
value is unique to the proposed connection
point and that a ‘one size fits all approach’ is
not a sensible platform for DG investment
assessment.
National policy, strategy and governance
structures have only just reached a point where
DG has a clear contribution to make and
opportunity to participate. Government policy
objectives with regard to pricing principles for
DG have not been developed into a consistent
industry approach to pricing methodolgy.
Some major worries have been expressed by
all lines companies with regards to formalizing
DG-policies at a national level:
• DG is often not as reliable and controllable
for lines businesses, which limits their
value in day-to-day operation of the lines
business
• All lines businesses express reservations in
signing long-term commitments in DG-
connection contracts and rebate/credit
prices in the light of changing Transpower
pricing methodology and treatment on the
Commerce Commission threshhold regime
which is due to be reset in 2009.
Additional concern has been expressed on
coordination of legislation between the
Electricity Commission and the MED. Coordina-
tion by one body would seem desirable.
Another issue with planning transmission
upgrades is that New Zealand’s transmission
system was built for large grid connected
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generation i.e. followed the decision to build
generation. It is not located in areas where
there are the most attractive DG resources
(typically along the east coast). Small-scale
developments can never support the cost of
major line interconnection. The Grid Upgrade
Plan process does not currently consider the
strategic merits of building of transmission
lines ahead of generation proposals to seed
generation development. The Electricity
Commission has a workstream “Facilitating
Renewables” underway to address this issue.
With recent direction for renewables signalled
by the New Zealand Energy Strategy more
certainty exists with respect to the planning
environment. Regions and communities now
have a starting point for developing their own
strategies, developing local resources for local
benefit customised to local opportunities. This
process should start with identification of
opportunity and analysis of optimal solutions
for local needs. It should necessarily have local
political leadership, combined with business
community and line company participation.
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ANNEX 1
Aggregated Distributed Generation by region and
district for New Zealand
National totals of DG by band and fuel type
This work was funded by NIWA under the EnergyScape Project
(Published with permission from NIWA)
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District Totals District Totals
Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 1 Type 2 Type 3
Geographic Region District (kW) (kW) (kW) Band 1 Total (kW) (kW) (kW) Band 2 Total (kW) (kW) (kW) Band 3 Total (kW) (kW) (kW) Band 4 Total (kW) (MW) (kW) (MW)
Northland
Far North 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 25000 25000
Whangarei 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Kaipara 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 25000 25000 25000 25.00
Auckland
Waitakere 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Manakau 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
North Shore City 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Papakura 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Auckland City 0 0.7 0 17141.8 0 0 22025 5400 7000 0 0 0 51567.5 51.57
Rodney 2 0 0 5824.5 0 0 4000 0 6000 0 0 0 15826.5 15.83
Total 2 0.7 0 2.7 22966.3 0 0 22966.3 26025 5400 13000 44425 0 0 0 0 67394 67.39
Waikato
Thames/Coromandel 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hauraki 2 0.7 0 0 0 0 0 4900 0 0 0 0 4902.7 4.90
Franklin 0 0 0 0 820 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 820 0.82
Hamilton City 0 0 0 1800 1800 920 0 0 0 0 0 0 4520 4.52
Waipa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Matamata-Piako 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Taupo 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6000 0 0 0 50600 56600 56.60
Waitomo 0 0 0 70 0 0 0 3000 0 0 0 0 3070 3.07
South Waikato 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7800 0 0 0 7800 7.80
Otorohanga 0 0 0 155 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 155 0.16
Waikato 0 0 0 1200 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1200 1.20
Total 2 0.7 0 2.7 3225 2620 920 6765 0 13900 7800 21700 0 0 50600 50600 79067.7 79.07
Bay of Plenty
Whakatane 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6360 0 0 35000 41360 41.36
Opotiki 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Western Bay of Plenty 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Kawerau 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Rotorua 0 0 0 0 375 0 0 0 3500 0 0 0 3875 3.88
Tauranga 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 50500 50500 50.50
Total 0 0 0 0 0 375 0 375 0 0 9860 9860 0 0 85500 85500 95735 95.74
Gisborne
Gisborne 0 0 0 0 0 0 4500 0 0 0 0 0 4500 4.50
Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4500 0 0 4500 0 0 0 0 4500 4.50
Hawkes Bay
Napier 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hastings 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Central Hawkes Bay 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Wairoa 0 0 0 0 320 0 900 0 0 0 0 0 1220 1.22
Total 0 0 0 0 0 320 0 320 900 0 0 900 0 0 0 0 1220 1.22
Taranaki
South Taranaki 0 0 0 340 0 400 0 0 1200 0 0 31400 33340 33.34
Stratford 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1000 0 0 0 1000 1.00
New Plymouth 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4500 0 0 0 4500 4.50
Total 0 0 0 0 340 0 400 740 0 0 6700 6700 0 0 31400 31400 38840 38.84
Manawatu Wanganui
Ruapehu 0 0 0 340 3100 0 3000 0 0 0 0 0 6440 6.44
Rangitikei 0 0 0 100 200 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 300 0.30
Manawatu 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Palmerston North 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2500 1000 0 0 0 3500 3.50
Wanganui 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4600 0 0 0 4600 4.60
Horowhenua 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Tararua 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 68000 0 68000 68.00
Total 0 0 0 0 440 3300 0 3740 3000 2500 5600 11100 0 68000 0 68000 82840 82.84
Wellington
Wellington 0 0 0 10260 1750 0 4100 4000 2700 0 16000 0 38810 38.81
South Wairarapa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8850 0 8850 8.85
Masterton 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Kapiti Coast 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Carterton 0 0 0 900 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 900 0.90
Total 0 0 0 0 11160 1750 0 12910 4100 4000 2700 10800 0 24850 0 24850 48560 48.56
Marlborough
Marlborough 0 0 0 540 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00
Nelson
Nelson City 0 0 0 1230 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1230 1.23
Total 0 0 0 0 1230 0 0 1230 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1230 1.23
Tasman
Tasman 0 0 0 1020 1360 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2380 2.38
Total 0 0 0 0 1020 1360 0 2380 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2380 2.38
West Coast
Buller 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Westland 0 0 0 0 662 0 0 4097 0 0 0 0 4759 4.76
Grey District 0 0 0 0 200 0 4050 0 0 0 0 0 4250 4.25
Total 0 0 0 0 0 862 0 862 4050 4097 0 8147 0 0 0 0 9009 9.01
Canterbury
Kaikoura 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hurunui 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Waimakariri 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Christchurch City 0 0 0 9095.2 500 0 11288 0 0 0 0 0 20883.2 20.88
Selwyn 0 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ashburton 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MacKenzie 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Timaru 0 0 0 600 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7500 8100 8.10
Waimate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Waitaki 0 0 0 2400 0 70 0 0 0 0 0 0 2470 2.47
Total 0 0 0 0 12095.2 600 70 12765.2 11288 0 0 11288 0 0 7500 7500 31453.2 31.45
Otago
Central Otago 0 0.8 0 0 0 0 0 24500 0 0 0 0 24500.8 24.50
Queenstown Lakes 0 2.5 0 2170 412 1000 0 1500 0 0 0 0 5084.5 5.08
Dunedin City 0 0.8 0 3790 0 0 0 2800 0 0 34000 0 40590.8 40.59
Clutha 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Waitaki 0 0 0 335 0 0 1500 0 0 0 0 0 1835 1.84
Total 0 4.1 0 4.1 6295 412 1000 7707 1500 28800 0 30300 0 34000 0 34000 72011.1 72.01
Southland
Gore 0 0 0 0 1600 0 0 0 1800 0 0 0 3400 3.40
Invercargill City 0 0 0 0 0 120 1000 0 0 0 0 0 1120 1.12
Southland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3800 0 7500 0 11300 11.30
Total 0 0 0 0 0 1600 120 1720 1000 0 5600 6600 0 7500 0 7500 15820 15.82
Chatham Islands
Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00
National Totals (kW) 4 5.5 0 9.5 58771.5 13199 2510 74480.5 56363 58697 51260 166320 0 134350 200000 334350 575160
National Totals (MW) 0.004 0.0055 0 0.0095 58.7715 13.199 2.51 74.4805 56.363 58.697 51.26 166.32 0 134.35 200 334.35 575.16
Total Regional 
DG
Total Regional 
DG
Band 1 (<10kW) Band 2 (10kW to 1MW) Band 3 (1MW to 5MW) Band 4 (5 to 50 MW)
Band 2 10kW to 1MW
Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Total Total
(kW) (kW) (kW) (kW) (MW)
Biogas 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CHP 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Coal/Gas 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Cogen 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Diesel 23610.2 0.0 1000.0 24610.2 24.6
Flare Gas 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Gas 0.0 2175.0 0.0 2175.0 2.2
Geothermal 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Geothermal 2008 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Hydro 1680.0 5562.0 70.0 7312.0 7.3
hydro 2008 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Landfill gas 0.0 0.0 920.0 920.0 0.9
LPG 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Mini-hydro 0.0 0.0 400.0 400.0 0.4
Natural Gas 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Petrol 30.0 0.0 0.0 30.0 0.0
PV 0.0 12.0 0.0 12.0 0.0
Sewage Digestor 0.0 0.0 120.0 120.0 0.1
Steam 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Steam Cogen 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Wind 0.0 825.0 0.0 825.0 0.8
Wind proposed 2008 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Unspecified 33991.3 4600.0 0.0 38591.3 38.6
TOTAL 75.0
Band 3 1MW to 5MW
Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Total Total
(kW) (kW) (kW) (kW) (MW)
Biogas 1000.0 0.0 4000.0 5000.0 5.0
CHP 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Coal/Gas 0.0 0.0 7800.0 7800.0 7.8
Cogen 0.0 0.0 3500.0 3500.0 3.5
Diesel 12320.0 0.0 0.0 12320.0 12.3
Flare Gas 0.0 0.0 2200.0 2200.0 2.2
Gas 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Geothermal 0.0 0.0 6360.0 6360.0 6.4
Geothermal 2008 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Hydro 0.0 33797.0 9100.0 42897.0 42.9
hydro 2008 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Landfill gas 0.0 0.0 1000.0 1000.0 1.0
LPG 4050.0 0.0 0.0 4050.0 4.1
Mini-hydro 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Natural Gas 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Petrol 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
PV 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Sewage Digestor 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Steam 0.0 2800.0 5600.0 8400.0 8.4
Steam Cogen 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Wind 0.0 2500.0 0.0 2500.0 2.5
Wind proposed 2008 0.0 1200.0 0.0 1200.0 1.2
Unspecified 38992.8 18400.0 11700.0 69092.8 69.1
TOTAL 166.3
Band 4 5MW to 50MW
Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Total Total
(kW) (kW) (kW) (kW) (MW)
Biogas 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CHP 0.0 0.0 5500.0 5500.0 5.5
Coal/Gas 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Cogen 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Diesel 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Flare Gas 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Gas 0.0 0.0 10000.0 10000.0 10.0
Geothermal 0.0 0.0 63000.0 63000.0 63.0
Geothermal 2008 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Hydro 0.0 35500.0 115500.0 151000.0 151.0
hydro 2008 0.0 6000.0 0.0 6000.0 6.0
Landfill gas 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
LPG 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Mini-hydro 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Natural Gas 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Petrol 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
PV 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Sewage Digestor 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Steam 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Steam Cogen 0.0 0.0 6000.0 6000.0 6.0
Wind 0.0 76850.0 0.0 76850.0 76.9
Wind proposed 2008 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Unspecified 0.0 16000.0 0.0 16000.0 16.0
TOTAL 334.4
Aggregated Distributed Generation by region and district for New Zealand National totals of DG by band and fuel type

